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Introduction 
Trading has been around since time immemorial. There have always been parties that 
possess something that other parties need or want. The purpose of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) was to create an 
equal playing field between parties that operate under different jurisdictions, different 
conditions and legislations. The CISG was to act as a rulebook in international trade, 
one that sets in proverbial stone the guidelines and rules for parties selling and buying. 
The CISG effectively establishes obligations on both parties, not just the seller. In this 
regard, this research is aimed at studying the rights and responsibilities of both the 
buyer and the seller as imposed by the articles of the CISG. However, the text of the 
CISG alone is at times insufficient in clarifying the correct interpretation of a 
contractual dispute. As such, at times of dispute, courts and arbitral tribunals may need 
to resort to secondary informative sources to determine the actual content of the parties' 
obligations. Such secondary sources are, first and foremost, the rulings of national 
courts and international arbitral tribunals that sometimes find themselves in a position 
where interpretation of the CISG is required. Moreover, scholarly opinions may also be 
considered as secondary sources. However, it is important to remember that none of 
those secondary sources are formally binding, they simply assist the relevant authority 
in their decision-making. Accordingly, this research paper will also make use of such 
sources in order to establish the prevailing views with regard to conformity 
requirements and rightful expectations of the parties. 
The obligations of both parties have effectively developed with time and there are 
increasingly more requirements that the parties need to be aware of and take into 
consideration. Whereas before, it was sufficient for a buyer to receive a certain good 
without any additional obligations imposed on the seller; now, the buyer may for 
instance require the seller to obtain the good from a specific source, manufacture the 
good in a certain way or produce the good using certain specific materials.  
The parties may be driven by various motives such as social responsibility or 
environmental awareness. For instance, the buyer might find it of great importance that 
no actual animal testing occurs in the manufacture of the goods it ordered. Such a 
requirement may even refer to the entire business operation of the seller, although in 
such situations, it would be recommendable to specify that requirement to the seller in 
2 
 
order to prevent any misunderstandings. On the other hand, it may, for example, be 
crucial to the seller for the buyer to not resell the goods to a certain location, such as a 
country where the seller’s country has declared a trade embargo. 
Contractual obligations and the expectations of the parties have effectively evolved. 
Such concerns now need to be taken into consideration when drafting contracts. 
Consequently, these concerns may later need assessment if the parties have collided into 
a dispute that needs resolution. In such situations, much is left to be determined: How 
did the parties make their expectations known? How did they abide by the agreed 
contractual obligations? Was there ever a violation of a contractual obligation? Did the 
aggrieved party ever make its expectations sufficiently known to the other party? Were 
the parties' expectations reasonable under the circumstances? 
This research paper now ventures to investigate the obligations and expectations, both 
just and unjust, of the parties in international trade, following a brief mandatory 
explanation of the concept of conformity. 
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What is Conformity? 
The concept of conformity is essentially defined by Article 35 of the CISG in its 
entirety. The article defines conformity as the nature of the goods that the buyer is 
entitled to expect based on contractual definitions, pre-contractual negotiations and the 
buyer’s purpose for the goods made known to the seller before the conclusion of the 
contract.
1
 Conformity relates to the goods themselves in one way or another, but there 
are instances where the seller may have breached the contract even though the goods 
that it delivered were in conformity with the contractual terms.
2
 Such situations will also 
be discussed in the following chapters of the text, as a simple contractual breach is, on 
many occasions, a more preferable approach compared to the artificial argument that the 
seller must have delivered non-conforming goods even though the tangible quality of 
the delivered goods was effectively without fault.  
In assessing the conformity requirements imposed on the ordered goods, the first 
paragraph of Article 35 establishes that “the seller must deliver goods which are of the 
quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are contained or 
packaged in the manner required by the contract.” 3 The interpretation of the content of 
this article will be discussed further in the following chapters, but the first paragraph 
sets up the primary basis for determining the conformity requirements for the goods.
4
  
Conformity is initially and mainly defined by the terms of the contract itself.
5
 However, 
pursuant to Article 8 of the CISG, contractual stipulations may be supplemented with 
additional information that is not specifically incorporated in to the contract document 
itself. To this effect, the main purpose of Article 8 is to aid in the interpretation of a 
disputed contractual clause.
6
 The third paragraph of Article 8 is especially relevant. It 
states that: 
In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person 
would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances 
of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have 
                                                          
1 Art. 35 CISG 
2 Schwenzer/Leisinger, p. 268 in stating that; Even if one finds that violation of ethical standards does not result in non-conformity 
of the goods in accordance with Article 35 CISG, if compliance with certain standards is a duty resulting from the contract, any 
non-compliance amounts to a breach of contract, giving rise to all remedies that are not specifically limited to cases of non-
conformity. 
3 Art. 35(1) CISG 
4 Enderlein/Maskow, p. 141 
5 Ibid. 
6 Henschel, Ch. 4.1; Neumann, para. 5  
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established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the 
parties.
7
 
Accordingly, any additional information that was available to the parties prior to the 
conclusion of the contract is pertinent in assessing the conformity requirements set for 
the goods.  
The second paragraph of Article 35 contains secondary norms to be used in determining 
the conformity requirements for the ordered goods.
8
 It creates basic requirements for the 
goods that are either typically expected of such goods or specifically expected by the 
buyer in situations where the buyer has made such an expectation known to the seller.   
Article 35(2) CISG states that: 
Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with 
the contract unless they: (a) Are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same 
description would ordinarily be used; (b) Are fit for any particular purpose 
expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, except where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or 
that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgement; (c) 
Possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a 
sample or model; (d) Are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such 
goods or, where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and 
protect the goods. 
9
 
Lastly, the third paragraph of Article 35 contains a notion that the buyer may not rely on 
the aforementioned paragraphs relating to the conformity of the goods in situations 
where the buyer either knew, or could not have been unaware, of the imminent 
nonconformity of the ordered goods.
10
  
Failure on the seller’s part to deliver conforming goods is uniformly understood as the 
seller having breached the contract, thus giving rise to all relevant remedies on the 
buyer’s part.11 However, the commercial court of Zürich has confirmed that in situations 
where the goods delivered by the seller are of the same value and usability to the buyer 
as conforming goods would have been, the seller has not necessarily breached the 
contract regardless of whether or not goods were effectively nonconforming.
12
 
                                                          
7 Art. 8(3) CISG 
8 Enderlein, pp. 156-157; Neumann, para. 6; Schlechtriem, p. 6-20 
9 Art. 35(2) CISG 
10 Art. 35(3) CISG 
11 BGH, 8.3.1995; LG Paderborn, 25.6.1996 
12 HG Zürich, 30.11.1998 
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Given all of the above, the term nonconformity relates to the goods themselves. 
Although goods may be nonconforming with the contract even if they are free of any 
tangible defects, the concept of conformity is still somewhat limited as a distinct 
relationship between the goods and the seller’s conduct is required in order for seller to 
have delivered nonconforming goods.  
It is important to note that a seller may have breached the contract even in a situation 
where the requirements for the conformity of the goods pursuant to Article 35 are met.
13
 
Such situations also need assessment to clarify the full range of remedies that are 
available to the buyer when the seller has not conducted its business in accordance with 
contractual requirements.  
The purpose of this research paper is not to simply investigate the position of the buyer 
and situations where the buyer is entitled to pursue contractual remedies. In the 
following chapters, the buyer’s obligations will also be covered thoroughly. It is 
pertinent to understand that the buyer may have a varying extent of obligations that are 
determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the prevailing circumstances at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. Moreover, the seller's position will likewise be 
addressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Schwenzer/Leisinger, p. 268 
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The Purpose of the Research (Scope and Limitations) 
This research paper intends to investigate the responsibilities of both parties in 
international trade. Although the main focus of the paper is directed at Article 35 of the 
CISG, it will also venture beyond that to ascertain the effects of additional contractual 
requirements that do not necessarily lead to the non-conformity of the goods yet 
nevertheless lead to a contractual violation that, in turn, activates the aggrieved party’s 
contractual remedies pursuant to the relevant articles of the CISG.  
The text will focus on contracts that are governed by the CISG, be it through the will of 
the parties or through a private international law analysis that leads to the application of 
the CISG as the relevant legislation. 
The paper will proceed step-by-step through the paragraphs of Article 35, studying the 
duties of both the buyer and the seller as imposed by the CISG. The author will also 
make some personal comments regarding the prevailing interpretations of the various 
paragraphs of the article. Particularly, the current broad concept of quality under Article 
35(1) will be discussed. It is the author’s opinion that the scope of Article 35 has 
expanded during the years leading to a point where it is effectively being used as a 
catch-all of contractual violations. Whether or not such an approach is to be endorsed 
will be addressed in detail. The paper is also aimed at discussing contractual violations 
beyond the concept of nonconformity. Additionally, the buyer's duties in examining the 
delivery and notifying the seller of a discovered defect pursuant to Articles 38 and 39 of 
the CISG will be covered.  
The use of remedies itself, by either party, pursuant to the various articles of the CISG 
will not be addressed in this research. This is for the simple reason that in doing so, the 
author can then focus more extensively on the issues already stated above.  
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Chapter 1 
Contractual Obligations and Rightful Expectations in Relation to 
Article 35(1) of the CISG 
1.1 Ascertaining the Expectations of the Parties 
The first paragraph of Article 35 sets forth the primary basis for the evaluation of 
conformity requirements that are imposed on the ordered goods.
14
 The delivered goods 
must effectively be of the quantity, quality and description as determined in the 
contract.
15
 Therefore, the contract itself is the primary tool in ascertaining the 
expectations of the parties. Buyers are expected to make known their motives and goals 
in order for the seller to take these concerns into consideration when fulfilling its part of 
the bargain. A buyer should make use of contractual stipulations in order to define the 
expected qualities and quantity of the goods in question. In this regard, the contract 
could, for example, call for the delivery of silk, which will be used for the manufacture 
of shirts. This contractual clause might alone be sufficient for the seller to deliver 
conforming goods.  
However, the contract document itself is not the sole device in determining contractual 
obligations, but, as already stated, contractual expectations are to be defined with regard 
to Article 8 of the CISG, as well as the additional paragraphs of Article 35, through 
which the buyer's ordinary and particular purpose for the goods may also be taken into 
consideration. Contracts may, at times, contain vague clauses; Parties may even expect 
certain qualities from the ordered goods or certain conduct of the counterparty even 
when the contract document itself is void of any such expectations. To this regard, 
Article 8 of the CISG, which is applied in situations where the interpretation of a 
contractual obligation is under dispute,
16
 relieves the parties of the burden of stipulating 
every contractual expectation in the contract document itself. It effectively enables 
additional information to be taken into consideration when ascertaining actual 
contractual obligations.  
With regard to the example above, the contract could then simply call for the delivery of 
textiles for the manufacture of shirts. However, during the contractual negotiations, the 
buyer could have provided more information to the seller regarding the textiles that was 
                                                          
14 Enderlein/Maskow, p. 141 
15 Art. 35(1) CISG 
16 Zeller, p. 631; Zuppi in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 143, para. 3 
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not specifically incorporated into the contract document itself. During the negotiations, 
the buyer could have, for example, stated that by 'textiles' the buyer was, in fact, 
referring to silk. This notification should then be taken into consideration by the seller, 
regardless of whether or not that expectation was added to the contract document.   
The contract and the additional information available to the parties at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract are then the principal instruments in determining whether a 
seller has delivered nonconforming goods or if the buyer had simply failed to 
sufficiently define the contractual purchase. In cases of the latter, the seller should not 
be held responsible. 
In a case tried in the district court of Paderborn in Germany, the court held that the 
blinds purchased by a German customer from a French seller were not in conformity 
with the terms of the contract pursuant to Article 35(1) CISG since the blinds lacked the 
necessary amount of titanium dioxide. This is a required substance that ensures the 
effectiveness of the blinds against sunlight.
17
 In that particular instance, it had been 
contractually agreed that the blinds would contain the prerequisite amount of titanium 
dioxide. By failing to adhere to this requirement, the seller delivered nonconforming 
goods.
18
 By defining the goods that it required in sufficient detail, the buyer ensured that 
the seller’s failure to meet the agreed upon terms would translate into a breach of the 
contract.  
Similarly, in a case tried in the Swiss Supreme Court, it was found that the seller had 
breached the contract pursuant to Article 35(1) by failing to deliver goods of the correct 
quantity. The parties agreed upon the delivery of a certain amount of cable drums and 
the seller’s failure to meet the exact number of cable drums was deemed a violation of 
the contract.
19
 
In reference to the above two instances, whenever the parties have precisely agreed on 
the delivery of goods of a certain quality or quantity, the seller’s failure to meet the 
agreement is equated to a breaching of the terms of the contract pursuant to Article 
35(1) of the CISG. The buyer effectively reinforces its position by carefully drafting the 
contract and including information that is vital to ensure the delivery of suitable goods. 
                                                          
17 LG Paderborn, 25.06.1996 
18 Ibid. 
19 BG, 7.7.2004 
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Contrary to the previous two cases, in the New Zealand Mussels case tried in the 
German Supreme Court, the buyer failed to define the ordered goods in sufficient detail. 
In that instance, a German buyer ordered mussels from a Swiss seller. The delivered 
mussels failed to meet the recommendations set forth by the German health authority, 
due to which the buyer subsequently claimed nonconformity of the delivered mussels. 
Contrary to the buyer’s claims, the Court stated that the seller should not be held 
responsible for ascertaining the relevant public law standards when those standards are 
different from those in the seller’s place of business. The buyer was consequently held 
responsible for not informing the seller of these health standards. As a result, the Court 
found no violation of the contract with regard  to Article 35(1) of the CISG.
20
 As far as 
the seller was concerned, it had delivered goods that were in accordance with the quality 
stipulated in the contract. 
Depending on the situation, the buyer may be obligated to relay information to the seller 
to various extents. In the New Zealand Mussels case, the buyer was deemed to be in a 
better position to inform the seller of the prevalent health regulations in its place of 
operation, and so the Court found it unreasonable to require the seller to ascertain such 
information when the other party was already in the know. 
To clarify the importance of Article 8 of the CISG in connection with ascertaining 
conformity requirements set for ordered goods, Dr. Bruno Zeller's opinion may be of 
some help. According to Dr. Zeller, "Article 8 is relevant as soon as a question of intent 
arises. In other words, if there is a real or perceived misunderstanding between the 
parties, Article 8 must be consulted to elicit the true intent."
21
 Accordingly, if the parties 
have made their contractual expectations explicitly clear, there would be no need to 
resort to Article 8. 
1.1.1 The Intent of the Parties 
Although it may seem that Article 35(1)  creates obligations solely on the seller in 
stating that the seller must deliver goods of the correct quantity, quality and description 
as agreed upon, it also relegates to the buyer a responsibility to establish the definition 
of ‘correct’ with regard to the quality, quantity and description that it expects. To this 
extent, the buyer’s actual and assumed intent is of foremost importance. This sentiment 
is supported by scholar Kristian Maley, according to whom “conformity is essentially a 
                                                          
20 BGH, 8.3.1995 
21 Zeller, p. 631 
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description of the extent to which the goods concord with the parties' actual intent and 
presumed intent.”22  
The crux of the issue of contractual obligations then relates to the intent of the parties at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract. If the buyer has made its expectations 
sufficiently known regarding the quality of the goods it expects, the quantity to be 
delivered and the conduct that is otherwise expected of the counterparty, then reference 
to Article 8 of the CISG is not necessary. Article 8 simply contains rules to resolve 
situations where the parties have clashing understandings regarding contractual 
obligations.
23
 Professor Jacob Ziegel, in fact, specifically states that: "[Article] 8 is 
concerned with rules for determining the parties' intentions where their language or 
conduct is ambiguous or, quaere, where, to the knowledge of the other party, the first 
party was operating under a mistaken assumption of fact."
24
 Accordingly, Article 8(1) 
of the CISG states that "for the purposes of this Convention statements made by and 
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other 
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was." 
25
  
It is submitted that while the text of the article merely refers to ‘statements’ made by the 
parties, the article should also be applied when interpreting the contract as a whole or 
when interpreting separate contractual clauses.
26
 It is clear that the primary obligation of 
any party with regard to the concept of nonconformity and contractual violations in 
international trade is to make their intent known to the other contracting party.
27
 This is 
especially important in relation to the contracted goods and any extraordinary conduct 
that a buyer expects from a seller. Such action is recommended, for example, when the 
buyer expects that the seller adheres to ethical standards in the manufacture of the 
ordered goods. 
28
 As stated by Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer and Benjamin Leisinger:  
The first way to incorporate ethical standards into sales contracts is to stipulate 
that the seller, for example, has to abide by specific  standards concerning 
human rights, labor conditions or the environment. By so doing, such norms 
become part of the contract and may be enforced, or their violation sanctioned, 
in the same way as with any other terms. It is highly advisable that the interested 
party insists on incorporating such express terms into the contract, in order to 
circumvent any later disputes in this respect.
29
 
                                                          
22 Maley, p. 83  
23 Zuppi in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 143, para. 3 
24 Ziegel, Art. 8, para. 1 
25 Art. 8(1) CISG 
26 BG, 22.12.2000; Huber, p. 235; Sun, p. 72; Zuppi in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 143, para. 2  
27 Schmidt-Kessel in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, p. 151, para. 10 
28 Schwenzer/Leisinger, p. 264 
29 Ibid. 
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Having made its intent clear, a party can rely on the fact that the counterparty may no 
longer argue that it was unaware of it.
30
 In relation to Article 35(1) of the CISG, a buyer 
might, for instance, clarify to the seller that it wishes to purchase organic goods that 
need to have been manufactured in a certain manner. Insofar as this intent has been 
made sufficiently clear, the seller can no longer argue a different understanding. As 
regards the previous example of a textiles purchase, for as long as the buyer, in one way 
or another, informed the seller of the fact that it expected the delivery of silk for the 
manufacture of shirts and the seller either was aware, or at the very least could not have 
been unaware, of that expectation, the buyer can then justifiably expect the delivery of 
suitable silk or claim nonconformity of the delivered goods.    
Article 8, however, reaches even beyond the aforementioned. For as long as the 
counterparty is aware of the intent, regardless of how it garnered such knowledge, it is 
then accordingly bound by that knowledge.
31
 Article 8(1) effectively acknowledges the 
difficulties that a party may encounter in attempting to establish that the counterparty 
was factually aware of its intent.
32
 A buyer may have taken a multitude of efforts in 
clarifying that it wished to purchase, for instance, organically manufactured products, 
yet that expectation may not have been written down in the contractual document itself. 
Establishing actual and definite knowledge of the seller in that situation may be 
impossible for the buyer, but the buyer may still argue that the seller could not have 
been unaware of buyer's intent.  
Article 8 of the CISG provides the relevant authority, as well as the parties, with rules to 
resolve contractual disputes and differences regarding the interpretation of a contractual 
obligation.
33
 Through the text of the article, the parties are encouraged to make their 
intent known to the other party, but the intent need not necessarily be written in the 
terms of the contract itself.  
Party intent, and a shared intent at that, is naturally first sought to determine the correct 
interpretation of a contractual clause.
34
 A shared intent, regardless of how unreasonable 
it is, will always prevail when ascertaining actual contractual obligations.
35
 Only in a 
situation where a joint and shared understanding is not ascertainable would a court or an 
arbitral tribunal be in position where it might have to presume that the counterparty 
                                                          
30 Enderlein/Maskow, p. 63 
31 Ibid. 
32 Farnsworth in Bianca/Bonell, p. 98, para. 2.3 
33 Schmidt-Kessel in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, p. 151, para. 10 
34 BG, 5.4.2005; HG Aargau, 5.2.2008; HG Aargau, 26.11.2008 
35 Lautenschlager, p. 260 
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could not have been unaware of the opposing party's expectations. When neither of the 
above options are applicable, the court would then have to resort to the complementary 
determination of what understanding a reasonable person would have had in that 
particular situation, in accordance with Article 8(2) of the CISG so as to determine the 
correct interpretation of a disputed contractual expectation.
36
 
As stated above, according to Article 8(3) of the CISG, any interpretation of a 
contractual obligation must be done with regard to all relevant information that was 
available to the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
37
 Therefore, the 
parties may inform the counterparty of any contractual expectations in any way, for as 
long as this is done before the conclusion of the contract. Naturally, any such 
expectations must be made known in sufficient detail in order from them to qualify as 
justifiable contractual obligations. In this context, Article 8(1) CISG specifically 
requires that the opposing party must either be aware of such expectations or at least be 
in a position where it should have been aware of the said expectations.
38
 In these 
situations, the wording of Article 8(1) CISG is clear. The relevant authority, be it a court 
or an arbitral tribunal, is entitled to, until a certain point, presume a party to have been 
aware of the other party's intent and purpose for the contract.
39
 To this effect, in a case 
tried in the Appellate Court of Grenoble, the seller had made it known to the buyer on 
multiple occasions that the contracted goods were to be resold either in South America 
or Africa. The buyer ignored this requirement and instead decided to resell the goods to 
Spain. The Court held that the buyer could not have been unaware of the seller's intent 
for the goods to be resold to a specified location and, by violating this requirement, the 
buyer had breached the contract between it and the seller.
40
 The seller had brought forth 
its contractual expectations in a sufficient manner and could thus justifiably expect the 
buyer to adhere to them. 
 
The party claiming that the counterparty either knew, or at the very least could not have 
been unaware, of its contractual expectations bears the burden of proof regarding such 
knowledge.
41
 In these scenarios, the asserting party should provide the court or arbitral 
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tribunal with enough evidence and argumentation to leave the court or arbitral tribunal 
in a position where it would feel comfortable in presuming that the counterparty could 
not have been unaware of such expectations.  
 
It is the author's opinion that more demanding and unique contractual expectations 
require more precise notifications to the other party. This sentiment is also echoed in 
scholar Schwenzer's writings, where she urges parties to specifically inform the 
counterparty of any requirements regarding expected ethical conduct. 
42
 
With regard to the aforementioned, it ought to be stated that regarding the standard for 
presuming party knowledge in accordance with Article 8(1) of the CISG, scholarly 
writings separate this concept of 'could not have been unaware,'  from the wording 
'ought to have known,' which can also be found within the texts of the CISG. It is 
generally understood that the specific wording of 'could not have been unaware' requires 
a greater level of negligence on the counterparty's behalf.
43
 In fact, Professor Peter 
Huber states that the phrase 'could not have been unaware' is comparative to 'gross 
negligence'.
44
 
1.1.2 The Understanding of a Reasonable Person 
It is submitted that ascertaining actual party intent and the knowledge of the 
counterparty may, at times, prove to be a demanding, if not impossible, task. Therefore, 
paragraph two of Article 8 of the CISG is frequently resorted to.
45
 Article 8(2) of the 
CISG states: "If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and 
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a 
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same 
circumstances." 
46
  
Although the second paragraph of Article 8 is numerically placed in a secondary 
position in terms of ascertaining party intent, it is submitted that in practice, it provides 
courts and arbitral tribunals the principal tool in determining the to-be-prevailing 
interpretation of a contractual obligation.
47
 When resorting to Article 8(2) CISG, the 
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court or arbitral tribunal must assess the understanding that a reasonable person in the 
position of the party receiving a statement or witnessing a certain act would have had.
48
 
In these situations, the parties need to prove that they have made their contractual 
expectations known in such a manner that a reasonable person would have understood 
those expectations based on the statements that were made and actions that were taken. 
Article 8(3) of the CISG is again of some relevance as all pertinent information must 
also be taken into consideration when determining the understanding that a reasonable 
person would have had.
49
  
The statements presented above are best simplified with the use of an example, wherein 
a buyer is particularly motivated by ethical standards. To discover suitable 
manufacturers to contract with, the buyer conducts ethical audits on potential candidates 
in order to ensure that the manufacturer fulfills all the necessary prerequisites, but the 
contract itself only contains a somewhat vague clause calling for the seller to adhere to 
common ethical standards in the manufacture of the ordered goods. It is the position of 
the author that in this scenario, it may be easily argued that the buyer could justifiably 
expect the manufacturer to adhere to the standards that have been raised in the ethical 
audit prior to the conclusion of the contract even when the contract itself is not similarly 
specific. In this particular scenario, the buyer could claim that the seller, by violating 
those standards in the manufacture of the ordered goods, has delivered goods that were 
not of the quality that the buyer was entitled to expect. As a result, the seller has 
violated Article 35(1) of the CISG. 
The addressee, that is, the party arguing a different understanding of a contractual 
obligation, must establish two different factors in order for a tribunal or court to concur 
with its view of the obligations that had been imposed by the contract.
50
 Firstly, it must 
be confirmed that the addressee was factually under a different understanding as to the 
contractual obligation. Secondly, the addressee would have to argue that a reasonable 
person in its position would have assessed the situation in a similar manner.
51
 Regarding 
the conformity of the goods, the buyer could, for instance, argue that it had made it clear 
to the seller that it wished to only purchase goods that had been manufactured 
organically. On the other hand, the seller could argue that it was under the 
understanding that the buyer was not concerned with how the particular goods were 
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produced. In situations like these, the seller needs to first establish that it was truly 
unaware of the buyer's intent. Moreover, it needs to prove that a reasonable person in its 
position, pursuant to Article 8(2) of the CISG, would have arrived at the same 
conclusion. 
A court case from the Supreme Court of Switzerland may be referred to in order to 
further clarify the explanation given in the above paragraph. In that particular case, the 
contract concerned the delivery of a used textile machine. Following the delivery of the 
machine, the buyer discovered defects in the machine and claimed nonconformity of the 
goods pursuant to Article 35(1) of the CISG. The Supreme Court decided that because 
the machine had been built 14 years prior to the purchase and because the buyer was an 
expert in the field, the seller was entitled to expect inquiries from the buyer regarding 
the functioning of the machine. Without any distinct inquiries, the seller was justified in 
its expectations that the buyer wished to buy the machine in the condition that it was in 
at the time of purchase. Accordingly, the Court found that there had been no violation of 
Article 35(1) since the seller had been under the impression that the buyer explicitly 
wished to purchase a used machine. The Court also emphasized that the understanding 
of a reasonable person in the position of the seller would have been similar to the 
seller's, that is, that the buyer wished to purchase the used machine in the shape and 
form it was in at the time.
52
 In reference to the statements above, the Court first needed 
to establish that the seller was not, nor could it have been, aware of the intent of the 
buyer as regards the functioning of the machine. Following that analysis, the court also 
needed to ascertain that the understanding of a reasonable person would have been 
similar to the seller's in order for the seller's understanding to prevail. 
On a broader level, with regard to scenarios where the understanding of a reasonable 
person is to be determined, the parties are likely to refer to any and all beneficial factors 
to their case to further solidify why a reasonable person would have had an 
understanding akin to their statements.  
Interpretation of separate contractual clauses and contractual expectations should 
always be done by paying close attention to the contract itself in its entirety and to the 
purpose behind the conclusion of the contract.
53
 In the author's opinion, this is of 
particular importance when resorting to Article 8(2) of the CISG and considering the 
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understanding of a reasonable person. This is true for the simple reason that the standard 
of a reasonable person might otherwise lead to an interpretation that has drifted too far 
from the original purpose of the contract for the parties. The same conclusion is also 
supported by the fact that the CISG accepts the concept of falsa demonstratio non 
nocet,
54
 whereby even faulty demonstrations of intent do not invalidate an agreement 
when both parties have made the same mistake. Accordingly, by bringing forth the 
ultimate purpose behind the contract, a contractual party in international trade inevitably 
enforces its position regarding any future disputes.  
When drafting contractual clauses, parties should also acknowledge that arbitral 
tribunals and courts are likely to place a substantial amount of weight on the typical 
meaning given to the phrases used.
55
 The commercial court of Zürich, for example, held 
that the concept of exchange (austausch) is understood to mean that when goods are to 
be replaced, the seller is expected to take back the original goods.
56
 Naturally, the 
ordinary meaning of phrases do not overweigh party intent when that intent can be 
ascertained,
57
 but parties should nonetheless be mindful of the general meaning that is 
given to the phrases used, especially when they clash with the intended meaning. 
In a disputed situation where two parties are claiming to have understood a contractual 
obligation differently and neither party can establish that the other party factually was, 
or at least should have been, aware of their particular intent, the deciding authority, be it 
an arbitral tribunal or a court, must determine what a reasonable person would have 
understood in that situation based on all the information that was available. According 
to Professor Allan Farnsworth, in such a situation, a court or arbitral tribunal should 
primarily look for the most reasonable and sensible interpretation.
58
 In this situation, as 
noted by Professors Fritz Enderlein and Dietrich Maskow, the end result could very well 
be an interpretation that goes against the intent of the party making the original 
statement.
59
 That is, of course, only the case when the addressee's understanding was 
more reasonable, given the circumstances.  
Given the above, parties operating in international trade should naturally aim to ensure 
that their particular intent regarding the conformity of the goods and any additional 
contractual expectations are sufficiently demonstrated to the counterparty. However, 
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should the need  to argue the reasonability of their interpretation arise, parties should 
effectively aim to establish that not only was their particular understanding made clear, 
but also that such an understanding was more reasonable than the one the opposing 
party is claiming.  
1.1.3 Contra Proferentem 
In connection with the CISG, international case law and scholarly writings contain 
certain rules that may be applied when a court or an arbitral tribunal is to determine the 
to-be-prevailing interpretation between two clashing ones. The principle of contra 
proferentem, which asserts that ambiguous contractual terms should be interpreted 
against the party that drafted the clause,
60
 is arguably the most well known of those 
rules. The principle is applicable when assessing the understanding that a reasonable 
person would have had pursuant to Article 8(2) of the CISG in a situation where only 
one of the parties drafted the disputed contractual clause. In situations where the 
contractual wording is open to multiple reasonable interpretations, the party that is 
solely responsible for drafting the clause may then be held responsible for leaving the 
proverbial window open.
61
 Professor Honnold placed a great deal of weight upon the 
drafter of a term, specifically stating that in international trade where parties operate 
under different jurisdictions and frequently come from different language backgrounds, 
parties drafting contractual clauses should be especially mindful of any ambiguity that 
might be present in the interpretation of a contractual clause.
62
 
It is noteworthy that any ambiguity in the wording of a contractual clause may be 
eliminated by providing the counterparty additional information through, for example, 
oral conversations prior to the conclusion of the contract or otherwise taking action in a 
certain manner that is sufficient to address such ambiguities pursuant to Article 8(3) of 
the CISG.
63
 As such, although a contractual clause may, at first glance, be seen as 
ambiguous and open to various understandings, the issue could have already been 
addressed by other means. The principle of contra proferentem can be easily seen as a 
solution to situations where the understanding of a reasonable person may not otherwise 
be ascertained and the parties were effectively under different understandings regarding 
the meaning of the clause. Awareness of this principle is of primary importance to 
parties operating in international trade, especially when a particular party frequently 
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incorporates into contracts terms that have been drafted by that party alone. 
Understandably, the principle is most frequently applied in cases where the ambiguous 
contractual clause is a standard clause that the drafting party attaches to all of its 
contracts.
64
  
It is important to remember that the principle does not establish an unavoidable rule that 
a court or an arbitral tribunal must decide against the party that drafted a clause.
65
 For 
example, as stated in the Unidroit Principles Article 4.6, "if contract terms supplied by 
one party are unclear, an interpretation against that party is preferred [emphasis 
added]." 
66
 The aim of the principle of contra proferentem is not to provide a 
compulsory rule for contract interpretation, but instead assist courts and arbitral 
tribunals in situations where a solution may otherwise not be found.  
The author finds it of utmost importance that the scope of the principle remains limited. 
In the opposite situation, parties in international trade might be discouraged to draft 
terms, especially standard terms, the use of which has led to an increased effectiveness 
in international trade when the parties do not have to carefully converse and exchange 
thoughts as to each and every contractual clause. Increased application of the principle 
may also lead to situations where parties try to benefit from certain contractual clauses 
that are open to multiple interpretations, even when they are aware of the counterparty's 
understanding of that clause. Accordingly, the use of the principle should more so be 
seen as a tool of last resort and left to cases where a stronger and more influential 
contractual party imposes their standard terms onto a weaker party that justifiably 
understood the contractual obligation differently. In any case, parties operating in 
international trade that frequently incorporate standard clauses in their contracts would 
be wise to take this principle into consideration and avoid any ambiguity, if at all 
possible. 
1.1.4 Contract Supplementation 
By way of Article 8(3) of the CISG, an arbitral tribunal or court may also take into 
consideration the practices that have been established between the parties and relevant 
trade usages when determining both the actual intent of the parties as well as the 
understanding that a reasonable person would have had.
67
 Regarding established 
practices, the parties may have used a certain contractual clause during previous 
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business dealings.
68
 If the interpretation of that particular clause was established during 
that purchase, there is then no need to further specify the interpretation of the clause 
during the latest purchase unless said interpretation is to be changed. Naturally, it would 
be wise to ensure that a shared understanding may be proven in case of a dispute. 
Relevant trade usages may also be applied as a device for establishing party intent or the 
understanding of a reasonable person when such usages are recognized in the parties' 
places of operation.
69
  
In addition to being used as a device for establishing party intent and contractual 
expectations with regard to Article 8 of the CISG, established practices between the 
parties and trade usages may also be utilized as supplementary tools for determining 
conformity requirements and expected party conduct even in the absence of references 
to such practices or usages in the terms of the contract. This is established in Article 9 of 
the CISG. 
70
  
A buyer may have justifiable expectations for the conformity of the goods on the basis 
of established practices and relevant usages, even without explicit stipulation of the 
applicability of such rules. Both parties may even be entitled to expect certain conduct 
from the counterparty based on previous business dealings and applicable usages. 
Parties may also believe that the contract contains certain rights that are accorded to 
both parties by way of established practices and usages. For example, in the case of 
Hannaford v. Australian Farmlink, the respondent argued that it was entitled to reduce 
the contractual price in accordance with the practice that had been established between 
the parties. The court, in that instance, admitted that established practices indeed enable 
the implementation of additional contractual rights. However, in that particular case, the 
respondent failed to establish the existence of the practice in question.
71
 
With regard to the above, Article 9(1) of the CISG is clear in its wording. It provides 
that: "the parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any 
practices which they have established between themselves."
72
 In order to simplify the 
issue, established practices and usages will be addressed separately in the following 
paragraphs. Moreover, the second paragraph of Article 9, which contains the notion of 
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the application of international usages, will likewise be handled separately, although it 
may be also seen as creating rightful expectations to the parties.
73
 
1.1.4.1 Established Practices 
When considering the existence of any established practices that may be relevant in 
assessing actual contractual obligations and justifiable expectations, the only factor of 
concern is previous business dealings between the involved parties.
74
 Those dealings 
may have created certain expectations that one of the parties may rely on 
75
 even if the 
latest contract was silent on the issue. In fact, scholar Bout is of the opinion that a 
practice that has been sufficiently established automatically creates obligations for the 
parties unless the circumstances during the latest contract are significantly different or 
the parties have specifically agreed on the circumvention of the previously established 
expectations.
76
 Practices, by their very nature, may only be relevant between the parties 
to which the practice has become custom.
77
 In this context, they are distinctly different 
from usages that may apply to parties operating in a certain industry, possibly even 
globally. 
In order for a practice to be considered ‘established’, a certain level on continuity is 
required.
78
 The appellate court of Grenoble has, for instance, held that since an Italian 
seller continued to supply its buyer with the requested goods for an extended period of 
time without making an inquiry regarding the solvency of the buyer, its actions had 
created justifiable expectations on the buyer. By suddenly discontinuing the deliveries 
on these grounds, the seller was deemed to be in violation of the contract, thus enabling 
the buyer to pursue damages.
79
  
In reference to a ‘certain level of continuity’, the author relies on various court cases, 
wherein it was found that two contracts are not yet sufficient to create an established 
practice between the parties.
80
  
For a party to be entitled to rely on the concept of an established practice, the practice 
must have created actual and definite expectations on the reliant party.
81
 Parties wishing 
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to rely on an established practice must prove the existence of such a practice. 
82
 There is 
no reason why a party cannot rely on an established practice in connection with a 
conformity requirement in accordance with Article 35 CISG.
83
 Therefore, a buyer could 
potentially claim nonconformity of the delivered goods pursuant to Article 35(1) of the 
CISG because the seller violated an established practice and that it as a result delivered 
goods that were not of the quality required. The prerequisite quality may have been 
determined in a previous contract, and if the latest contract considered the same goods, 
the buyer could have justifiable expectations for the goods even if the latest contract did 
not contain a similar contractual clause or even if the quality of the goods had not been 
discussed. On the other hand, the seller may have, for instance, made it clear to the 
buyer that it wished for the goods to be resold to a certain location during the initial 
contract between the parties. In a situation where there would be multiple contracts 
between the parties, the seller could have justifiable expectations that the buyer would 
continue to adhere to this obligation even if it was not discussed further. 
As for the concept of an established practice, the author simply wishes to make it clear 
that parties can define any and all contractual obligations and expectations during the 
initial contract between the parties. It stands to reason, and it is also economically 
viable, to support the supposition that these expectations do not require reiteration when 
parties decide to continue business dealings with each other. Unless further notice is 
provided and the contract considers the same goods, the parties should take into 
consideration the intent of the counterparty that was made clear during the past business 
dealings.   
1.1.4.2 Agreed Upon Usages 
The usage referred to in Article 9(1) of the CISG should be separated from the one 
contained in Article 9(2). Article 9(1) specifically refers to a usage that has been agreed 
upon between the parties.
84
 The incorporation of a usage to a contract may be done 
expressly or impliedly.
85
 Standards such as the Tegernseer Gebräuche 
86
 are frequently 
agreed upon between the parties, both impliedly and expressly, and along with such 
standards come certain justifiable expectations. By agreeing on these recognized 
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standards, the parties again save themselves the trouble of defining certain issues in 
detail in the contract document.
87
 Through Article 9(1) of the CISG, parties may refer to 
any recognized usages or standards that do not have to fulfill the requirements set for 
international usages in Article 9(2).
88
 Therefore, Article 9(1) enables the parties to 
simplify the process of contract negotiations in situations where a certain set of rules or 
standards sufficiently express their contractual expectations.  
To a certain extent, the parties may be presumed to have agreed on the application of 
certain standards.
89
 Such a presumption may be made, for example, in a situation where 
both contracting parties participate in the same private initiative such as the United 
Nations Global Compact.
90
 Therefore, having the knowledge that the counterparty also 
takes part in the same private initiative, in a sense, enables a party to rely on the fact that 
both parties will adhere to the terms of that initiative when dealing with each other, even 
without it having been explicitly agreed upon.  
With regard to the above, the author wishes to make the distinction between private 
initiatives and public initiatives such as the conventions of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). Both parties coming from states that have ratified a certain 
international treaty does not by itself create an obligation on a private level that the 
parties may automatically rely on. Having said that, in a situation where a party wishes 
such rules to be applicable to a particular private contract, it is recommendable to make 
this intent known to the counterparty. 
Seeing that because of Article 9(1) of the CISG, parties may effectively be seen as 
having impliedly agreed on the application of a certain set of rules or standards and so 
parties would be wise to recognize that certain behavior may be considered as a silent 
acceptance of the said rules.
91
 However, this is only the case when that party behaves in 
a manner that justifiably leads the counterparty to interpret this conduct as an 
acceptance. Such scenarios could, for instance, occur if the party operates particularly in 
accordance with a certain set of rules.
92
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1.1.4.3 International Usages  
International usages may become binding upon the parties even without the parties 
having agreed upon their application. To this effect, Article 9(2) of the CISG 
specifically states that:  
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew 
or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular 
trade concerned.
93
 
The incorporation of international trade usages is regarded as an extension of the actual 
intent and justifiable expectations of the parties.
94
 International trade usages apply in 
situations where it can be assumed that the parties are relying on them because they are 
widely recognized and observed, even if the parties did not explicitly discuss the 
application and relevance of those usages. As such, any party operating in the field of 
international trade may rely on such recognized standards, and if that standard is 
violated, the party may argue the breach of a contractual obligation so as long as the 
prerequisites regarding the applicability of the usage are met.  
In line with the concept of party autonomy, parties have the power to exclude the 
application of a recognized international usage that would otherwise be applied to their 
contract.
95
 The exclusion may be done either expressly or impliedly. 
In fact, Professor Pilar Perales Viscasillas goes as far as saying that “usages of trade in 
[Article] 9(2) [of the CISG] are objective in character and thus ought to be considered 
as an objective and normative rule and source of law in international sale of goods 
contracts.” 96 In that instance, the implied intent would not even be questioned, but 
international usages would automatically apply unless explicitly excluded. In any event, 
in order for an international usage to be applicable, certain prerequisites must be met. 
In order for a party to be entitled to rely on an international usage, the usage must be 
“widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved.” 
97
 It ought to be stated, however, that the concept of ‘international usage’ does not 
require global observance.
98
 What is necessary is that most of the parties operating in 
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the relevant industry or area conforms to this usage and recognizes its applicability.
99
 In 
fact, it is widely accepted in legal literature that even a usage of an entirely domestic 
nature can be applied as an international usage in accordance with Article 9(2) if the 
party from a different state has previously engaged in multiple similar contracts in that 
particular state.
 100
 Accordingly, it is recommended that parties inform themselves of 
such usages. 
Article 9(2) also requires that the parties must either have known of the usage or at least 
have been in a position where they ought to have known of the relevant usage.
101
 
International case law supports the supposition that implied knowledge of the parties is 
frequently applied, for instance, on the basis of residency in the area where such usage 
is recognized.
102
 Accordingly, widely known and regularly observed practices are of 
some importance to parties operating in international trade. Parties would be wise to 
stay up-to-date regarding usages to avoid unpleasant surprises, especially if the opinion 
endorsed by Professor Perales Viscasillas prevails, whereby any international usage that 
meets the prerequisites would automatically apply to a contract. Having knowledge of 
all the relevant usages enables the parties to decide which usages they wish to be 
applicable to their contract. Parties should also acknowledge that ignorance regarding an 
existing international trade usage does not protect them from the obligations imposed by 
that particular usage.
103
 
As it is with established practices, the party claiming the existence or applicability of a 
international usage bears the burden of proof regarding that issue.
104
 Notorious usages, 
however, need not be established by the claiming party, but instead the court or arbitral 
tribunal may take such usages into consideration ex officio.
105
 Accordingly, well known 
usages do not need to be explicitly referred to by the parties, but instead parties may 
automatically presume that the relevant authority will take that usage into consideration. 
Regarding international usages Professors Fritz Enderlein and Dietrich Maskow make 
one very important statement in the author's opinion. The Professors emphasized that 
certain usages may well be acknowledged in industrialized states, but that developing 
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countries might not yet be in a position where complete adherence is possible.
106
 Such 
usages might, for example, relate to certain ethical requirements that parties operating in 
industrialized countries take for granted, but parties from developing countries cannot 
yet oblige. Enderlein and Maskow accordingly then consider that such standards may 
only be applicable as international usages between two parties from industrialized 
states.
107
 This argument is consistent with the concerns raised by the delegates of 
socialist nations during the original drafting of the CISG. Those nations, in particular, 
were of the opinion that international trade usages are commonly established and 
created by industrialized states.
108
 With regard to the opinions of Enderlein and 
Maskow, especially concerning widely accepted international usages, experienced 
parties may, at times, take the application of such usages for granted.
109
 Accordingly, 
the author urges any parties contracting with parties from different backgrounds to 
consider the possibility that the usage might not bear the same weight or be 
acknowledged in the same manner in the state where the contracting party operates. 
Consequently, the global application of an international usage should be left to 
situations where it can be ascertained that the usage is, in fact, globally accepted and 
observed.  
Awareness of any applicable international trade usages is of special importance to 
parties new to the field.
110
 As previously stated, ignorance of the relevant trade usages 
does not protect a business from any obligations imposed by that particular usage.
111
 
Accordingly, any entry into a new field of operation should be done with due care and 
parties making these transitions should take the time to inform themselves of any 
relevant usages.  
1.2 Implementing Party Intent and Reasonable Expectations to 
Contractual Requirements in Connection with Article 35(1) of the 
CISG 
Article 35(1) calls for the buyer to establish the requisite quality, quantity and 
description for the goods that the seller is to deliver.
112
 Buyers are to make their 
expectations known regarding each of those three factors.
113
 In a situation where the 
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parties later find themselves in a dispute as to whether such expectations were 
sufficiently made known to the seller, the arbitral tribunal or court should take into 
consideration Articles 8 and 9 of the CISG in the manner explained in the previous 
portion of the text. In a situation where the characteristics of the delivery have not been 
adequately established, courts and arbitral tribunals should then refer to Article 35(2) of 
the CISG to determine what the parties were entitled to expect from the contract. 
In the following paragraphs, the author will explain and comment on the current views 
regarding the interpretation of Article 35(1) of the CISG. Moreover, the text will also 
attempt to clarify a recommended course of action for both a buyer and a seller in 
international trade regarding Article 35(1).  
1.2.1 Which Party Should Bear the Burden of Sufficiently Establishing the Requisite 
Quality, Quantity and Description? 
Before delving into the concepts of quantity, quality and description, the text will first 
discuss the crucial issue of which party should primarily be held responsible for 
defining the expected delivery. In this regard, it is important to understand that the 
extent to which the buyer is obligated to establish the characteristics of the delivery vary 
based on the circumstances. It could then be sufficient that the buyer, for example, 
explains that the machine it intends to purchase, functions in a certain manner and the 
seller then would determine the specific technical attributes for the machine to be able 
to meet those expectations.
114
  
According to Professor René Henschel, the obligation to deliver conforming goods falls 
first and foremost on the seller.
115
 In this context, the starting point would be to 
determine whether or not the seller has delivered goods that met the expectations of the 
buyer so as long as those expectations were sufficiently made known. Henschel justifies 
his reasoning on the basis that the seller ordinarily would know more regarding the 
goods to be delivered, whereas the buyer may not have even seen the goods yet.
116
 The 
buyer’s obligation to take part in determining the requisite quality and description 
would then increase based on the buyer’s knowledge of the goods to be delivered and 
the special requirements that the buyer expects of the goods and of the seller itself.
117
 As 
such, the buyer's expertise regarding the ordered goods is of primary importance.  
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The author concurs with the view of Professor Henschel. It stands to reason that the 
buyer may, to a certain point, rely on the expertise of the seller when the buyer itself 
does not possess the necessary knowledge. The buyer would then take part in 
establishing elements that it has knowledge of, such as the quantity of the goods it 
wishes to have delivered and the purpose for which the goods will be used. In a 
situation where the buyer possesses more knowledge than the seller, the buyer should 
effectively be an active party in clarifying the quality of the goods to be delivered. In 
this regard, when the buyer, for example, operates in a specific ethically-minded market 
wherein it is important for the buyer to ensure that the seller adheres to certain ethical 
standards in the manufacture of the ordered goods, the buyer should accordingly inform 
the seller of any such expectations that impose obligations on the seller's conduct. 
Another example could be a situation where the buyer is constructing a machine that 
requires reinforced steel. The buyer would contract with a steel supplier for the delivery 
of steel suitable for the construction of that machine. However, the steel supplier may 
not be aware of the fact that ordinary steel will not do. In this case, if the seller was later 
to deliver regular steel and not reinforced steel, the seller should not be held responsible 
for delivering nonconforming goods if it was not properly informed since the buyer was 
the party that possessed more knowledge regarding the purchased goods and should 
consequently bear the consequences of not establishing the delivery in sufficient detail.   
Taking the above into consideration, the obligations of the parties, in terms of defining 
the expected qualities of the goods are not difficult to assess. In situations where a 
buyer, for instance, purchases raw materials from multiple sources and the buyer itself 
is the party that combines the materials into a complete product, it would stand to reason 
for the buyer to then carry the ultimate responsibility in clarifying to the sellers its 
expectations with regard to the quality of the raw materials. On the other hand, in cases 
where the buyer is effectively not an expert as to what qualities the good is to have in 
order for it to be usable for the buyer's purpose and the seller can reasonably carry such 
a burden, the seller should then be the party that defines the requisite quality. 
1.2.2 The Quantity of the Goods to be Delivered 
Compared to the concept of quality, the correct quantity of the ordered delivery is 
usually easier to ascertain. The contract may contain an accurate specification of the 
amount of goods that is to be delivered or a certain window within which the delivery 
would be conforming to the terms of the contract. The contract might, for instance, refer 
to 50 000 trousers to be delivered, which, unless otherwise explained, does not leave 
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much room for interpretation for the seller. The contract might, for example, also state 
that the seller is to deliver 10 000-10 500 liters of juice. In such a situation, so as long as 
the quantum delivered falls within that frame, the seller would have delivered the 
requisite amount of juice. Any variation from the agreed upon quantum consequently 
leads to a nonconforming delivery on the seller’s part.118 However, certain industries do 
accept minor deviations from the agreed upon quantum without it being regarded as a 
contractual violation.
119
 
In this context, both the obligations of the buyer and the seller are fairly easy to 
ascertain. The buyer is urged to clarify in sufficient detail the quantity of the goods it 
expects the seller to deliver. By allowing the seller to deliver an amount within a certain 
frame, the buyer may not later claim nonconformity if the seller was to deliver as little 
or few of the agreed upon goods that the contract enables. Having made its expectations 
sufficiently known, the buyer may then rely on the seller to adhere to the requisite 
quantum. 
Interestingly, the seller’s delivery is also nonconforming in a situation where the seller 
delivers an excess amount of goods.
120
 As such, any seller operating in international 
trade should take into consideration the possibility that any delivery of goods in excess 
to the contract may lead to a situation where the buyer is entitled to refuse to take the 
delivery.
121
    
1.2.3 Ascertaining and Meeting the ‘Correct’ Quality 
In terms of Article 35(1) of the CISG, quality is generally understood to refer to the 
tangible condition of the goods.
122
 Ordinarily, parties would establish that the goods 
should be manufactured out of certain materials, be of a certain size or color and so 
forth.
123
 Failing to match those requirements would then relate to the seller having 
delivered nonconforming goods. As previously stated, in assessing whether or not the 
delivery, in the end, was nonconforming, regard should be made to the extent that the 
expected quality was established. To this effect, the buyer's position is ever stronger 
where the contractual expectations have been thoroughly explained.  
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A case handled by the Appellate Court of Basel-Stadt may be referred to in order to 
clarify the statements made above. In that instance, the parties had agreed on a delivery 
of a packaging machine. Following the delivery of the machine, the buyer discovered 
that the machine was not able to meet the agreed upon packaging pace even though the 
buyer had made it expressly clear to the seller that the machine was, at the very least, to 
reach an output of 180 vials per minute. In that case, the buyer had no knowledge 
regarding the technology that was necessary to construct a machine able to meet this 
requirement, but the seller, on the other hand, had such knowledge. Accordingly, the 
court deemed that having made its expectations clear as to the functioning of the 
machine, the buyer was entitled to rely on the fact that the machine delivered could 
perform in the agreed manner. As a result, the court found that the delivered machine 
was not of the quality required.
124
 
In the above case, the seller was the party that had the knowledge regarding the 
technology necessary to meet the buyer's expectations. The buyer informed the seller 
sufficiently of its expectations and the seller, having concluded the contract, accepted 
the obligation to deliver a machine that met those expectations. In a case where a buyer 
would have had more knowledge regarding the actual technology of the machine, its 
role would arguably have been more extensive. 
In another case, the Supreme Court of Austria found against the buyer, since it had not 
sufficiently addressed and clarified the quality of the pork liver it expected the seller to 
deliver. The parties, in that instance, had not agreed on any specific quality for the 
goods nor had the buyer informed the seller of any domestic regulations in Serbia 
regarding foreign meats. The delivered goods met the relevant EU-regulations and were, 
without a doubt, suitable for human consumption. Upon import to Serbia, the customs 
officials there nevertheless found the goods to be defective and denied entry of the 
meats. As a result, the buyer sued the seller on the basis of the seller having delivered 
nonconforming goods. The court found that the goods delivered had been of the quality 
the buyer was entitled to expect. Much like in the ruling of the New Zealand Mussels 
case,
125
 the court held the buyer responsible for informing the seller of any unique 
regulations that prevail in the destination state that are different than in the seller's place 
of operation. Accordingly, in order for the seller to take those regulations into 
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consideration, the buyer, as the party more knowledgeable of those rules, should inform 
the seller of their application.
126
 
The two cases referred to above demonstrate how the buyer's role in establishing the 
anticipated quality varies based on the actual and expected knowledge of the party. It is 
important to note that that general practice and contracts themselves, as with the 
quantity to be delivered, usually allow for minor deviations from the agreed upon 
quality.
127
 
1.2.4 The Broad Concept of Quality    
Although the usual understanding with regard to the term quality refers to the tangible 
attributes and performance of the delivered goods, the prevailing view in legal literature, 
as expressed by authors such as Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer and Professor Alastair 
Mullis, effectively establishes that the word quality in connection with the CISG 
encompasses not just the tangible quality of the goods, but also refers to beyond that to 
the manufacturer’s conduct in the production of the goods.128 Consumer preferences 
have effectively led to situation where the manufacturer’s conduct may be of 
importance to the initial buyer and, moreover, to a possible target audience for the 
goods. It may, for instance, be crucial to the buyer that the manufacturer produces the 
goods in an ethical manner in order for the buyer to be able to resell the goods further to 
consumers that are likewise motivated by such ethical standards.
129
 In accordance with 
the prevailing view in legal literature, such expectations may effectively impose 
requirements that the manufacturer must adhere to in order to deliver conforming goods. 
To this effect, the concept of party autonomy in relation to Article 35(1) of the CISG is 
not limited, but the parties may agree on virtually anything regarding the nature of the 
goods and how those particular goods should be manufactured.
130
  
As far as the buyer is concerned, its duty is to establish both the tangible nature of the 
goods it expects to receive and also any sort conduct it expects from the seller which 
might affect the usability of the goods for the buyer’s purposes. Such expectations 
should be made known in a sufficiently clear manner in order to eliminate the 
possibility of the seller arguing that it was not informed of such expectations, which 
then may not be used to determine the quality of the goods the buyer was entitled to 
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expect. The buyer could then effectively require that the goods it wishes to purchase 
should be, for instance, manufactured free from the use of child labor or manufactured 
in a manner that promotes sustainable development.
131
 If it was then later discovered 
that the seller did not adhere to these terms, the buyer could claim nonconformity of the 
delivered goods pursuant to Article 35(1) of the CISG, irrespective of whether or not the 
goods themselves were free of any tangible defects. 
Although a buyer may have various reasons for it to require goods to be manufactured 
in a certain manner, it is important to recognize that the way in which goods are 
manufactured also frequently affects the final value of the delivered goods.
132
 Such a 
sentiment is evident, for example, in the Organic barley case tried in the Appellate 
Court of Munich.
133
  In that particular instance, the buyer and the seller agreed on the 
delivery of organically manufactured barley. Even though organically manufactured 
barley cannot be distinguished from 'normal' barley post-production, it is sold at a 
different market compared to ‘normal’ barley. This is partly due to the fact that the 
production costs for organically manufactured barley are higher compared to regular 
barley. As a result, the final price of the organic barley is accordingly higher than 
regular barley. Due to a lack of necessary documentation, the delivered barley could not 
be sold in a European market as organic. Without such documents, the barley could only 
be sold at the price of regular barley, which consequently related to the seller having 
delivered barley that was not of the agreed upon value. Therefore, the court found that 
the seller delivered nonconforming goods pursuant to Article 35(1) of the CISG. In the 
end, the buyer, however, lost its right to rely on that nonconformity because it had 
delayed addressing it for too long pursuant to Article 39(1) of the CISG.
134
 
 
Similarly, ethically manufactured goods are likewise sold at a different market than 
goods that do not carry the same label. Certain consumers are effectively willing to pay 
more for the guarantee that the purchased good has been produced in a socially 
responsible manner.
135
 As a result, goods that have indeed been manufactured in an 
ethical manner are of a higher value than goods that do not come with that guarantee. In 
this context,  it then stands to reason that if the contract called for the seller to produce 
the goods in an ethical manner and the seller did not abide by this agreement, it would 
consequently deliver nonconforming goods, even if the goods themselves carried no 
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physical defects. If this deviation later becomes apparent to the buyer, it could then 
claim nonconformity of the delivered goods pursuant to Article 35(1) of the CISG. 
Naturally, the financial value of the goods may not be the only reason for imposing 
behavioral requirements on the seller. The buyer could also, for example, be motivated 
by religious standards, which might, in turn, lead to a need to have the goods 
manufactured in a certain manner.
136
 For instance, if a buyer ordered halal goods from a 
seller but received non-halal goods, the seller delivered goods not of the quality 
required, regardless of whether or not the goods were of the same financial value. 
As regards any intangible discrepancies, case law has also shown that the origin of the 
goods may also be a factor in determining whether or not the seller delivered goods in 
conformity with the contract.
137
 For example, in a case tried in the German Supreme 
Court where the contract concerned the delivery of cobalt sulphate, the parties agreed 
that the cobalt sulphate should be of British origin. It was later discovered that the 
delivered cobalt sulphate was made in South Africa, following which the buyer claimed 
nonconformity of the delivered goods pursuant to Article 35(1) of the CISG. The 
Supreme Court concurred with the opinion of the buyer that the seller had failed to 
adhere to a contractual obligation, and that, as a result, it had violated the terms of the 
contract.
138
 
Similarly, the Appellate Court of Zweibrücken deemed in a case that a seller had not 
delivered conforming goods when, against the original agreement of the delivery of 
goods of a German origin, it later provided the buyer with goods manufactured in 
Russia and Turkey.
139
 
The author acknowledges that the origin of goods may be of importance to the buyer for 
various reasons. Goods produced in a certain state may be inherently of higher value 
than goods manufactured in another state. The buyer may also be motivated by other 
concerns, such as the way goods are manufactured in different states.  On the other 
hand, the seller may also be interested in the final destination state for the goods. Such a 
sentiment can be seen in a case previously referred to, which was tried in the Appellate 
Court of Grenoble. In that instance, the seller had frequently informed the buyer of the 
fact that it required and expected the goods to be sold in Africa or South America. The 
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buyer failed to adhere to this expectation but instead decided to sell the goods in Spain. 
As a result, the court found that the buyer had violated an express term of the 
contract.
140
 
 
A good example of a situation where the origin or final destination state for the goods 
may be of importance to the parties is the so-called 'blood diamonds' (also known as 
'conflict diamonds'). Blood diamonds are utilized to fund armed conflicts and civil wars 
in Africa.
141
 Participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
142
 aim to 
ensure that diamonds are not used in funding such efforts. Accordingly, parties that 
participate in that scheme would not accept diamonds of certain origin or accept the 
delivery of diamonds to those countries wherein mistreatment might occur. 
 
In case of a violation of a behavioral requirement, the remedies available to the buyer 
are a different matter altogether. In this regard, the financial value of the delivered 
goods and the actual usability of the goods to the buyer are of primary importance. To 
this effect, Professor Stefan Kröll has stated that even if the arbitral tribunal or court 
were to find the seller as having delivered nonconforming goods but the delivered goods 
were of the same value as conforming goods would have been, the remedies available 
for the buyer will likely be limited.
143
 In such situations, the buyer cannot pursue 
damages and unless the nonconformity is seen as a fundamental breach of the contract, 
the buyer is not entitled to avoid the contract as a result.
144
 Moreover, in assessing 
whether or not the nonconformity amounts to a fundamental breach, the court or arbitral 
tribunal is likely to assess whether or not the buyer can still make reasonable use of the 
goods. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Switzerland, for example, took into 
consideration the fact that the buyer could still resell the defective goods, even if only at 
a discount and consequently held that the nonconformity did not amount to a 
fundamental breach of the contract. However, the buyer was awarded damages for the 
difference in value between the delivered goods and the ones initially agreed upon.
145
 
The above is also true as regards situations where the goods were procured from a state 
other than had been contractually agreed or delivered to a location that was different 
from otherwise expected. In the Cobalt Sulphate case, although the court did find a 
                                                          
140 CA Grenoble, 22.2.1995 
141 www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-human-rights/oil-gas-and-mining-industries/conflict-diamonds 
142 www.kimberleyprocess.com/ 
143 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 494, para. 18 
144 Ibid. 
145 BG, 28.10.1998 
34 
 
violation of a contractual obligation pursuant to Article 35(1) in that the seller had 
delivered goods of the wrong origin, the court denied the existence of a fundamental 
breach and consequently held that the buyer’s avoidance of the contract was 
unjustified.
146
 In the case handled by the Appellate Court of Zweibrücken where the 
goods were also of an incorrect origin, the court found the buyer to be entitled to receive 
damages, but only to the amount sufficient to rectify the difference in value between the 
goods agreed upon and the ones actually delivered.
147
 
 
Regarding any behavioral requirements, if the parties have agreed in the terms of the 
contract on liquidated damages that the breaching party must bear in case of a violation, 
the issue is naturally much easier to consider as that remedy could be pursued, 
regardless of the reason for ignoring that requirement. The above, of course, excludes 
reasons that justify contractual deviations in accordance with Article 79 of the CISG.
148
 
1.2.5 The Relevance of the Value and Utility of the Goods to the Buyer in Assessing 
the Presence of a Contractual Violation  
With regard to the previous sentiments, Professor Schwenzer has, in fact, stated that the 
actual usability and value of the goods are irrelevant when ascertaining whether or not 
the seller has breached the contract by delivering goods of a defective quality.
149
 In her 
opinion, a contractual violation is presumed whenever the goods do not match the 
expected quality and the value and usability of the goods are only relevant in assessing 
whether or not the nonconformity amounts to a fundamental breach.
150
 Although the 
concept of party autonomy enables parties to agree on virtually anything regarding the 
characteristics of the goods and how they are to be produced,
151
 the author finds it 
difficult to support such an extreme sentiment.   
The previously mentioned ruling from the commercial court of Zürich, in fact, 
established that when the seller has delivered goods that are effectively of the same 
value and utility as they would have been had the seller adhered to the obligations of the 
contract, the seller has not automatically breached the contract, even if the delivered 
goods were nonconforming.
152
 Although this view should not be taken too far, minor 
deviances that do not affect the value or usability of the goods for the buyer’s purposes 
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should not, in the author's opinion, automatically be seen as a contractual violation. The 
opposite conclusion would enable parties to pursue contractual repercussions even in 
situations where the buyer did not suffer in any way due to the discrepancy. Such view 
is in direct confrontation with the concept of reasonability, the application of which can 
be witnessed across the board when examining CISG related case law and the text of the 
CISG itself.  
 
In the author's view, the assessment of whether or not a minor defect in the physical 
quality of the goods relates to a contractual violation should be made on a case-by-case 
basis. To this effect, when the parties have, for instance, agreed on a certain color of 
trousers, if the seller delivers trousers of a different color, the seller has clearly violated 
the terms of the contract, irrespective of whether the buyer can still make use of the 
goods. On the other hand, in cases where the defect is not clearly visible and in no way 
affects the durability, usability or value of the delivered goods, such as a different 
manner in which a shirt was sewn, should not automatically be seen as a contractual 
violation. Scholar Schwenzer's supposition that a contractual violation is automatically 
presumed in cases of defective quality might lead to even more unreasonable situations 
in cases of intangible defects. In the author's opinion, it would not be reasonable to 
pursue contractual remedies in situations where the goods themselves were of flawless 
quality and perfectly usable for the buyer, but the seller merely deviated from the 
agreement in a minor way during the manufacturing phase. After all, the purpose of 
these international transactions is to obtain the goods, not to control and manage the 
entire business operation of the counterparty. 
 
In light of above argumentation, a situation can be considered where the buyer is from 
Germany and the seller from Sweden. The parties initially agree on the fact that the 
goods are to be manufactured in Sweden. However, during the manufacturing phase, the 
seller’s facilities are affected by a strike. In order to ensure timely delivery, the seller 
instead utilizes a factory located in Finland, where the goods are manufactured out of 
the same materials. Finally, the seller delivers goods to the buyer that are of exactly the 
same tangible quality, value and usability as goods manufactured in Sweden would have 
been. Should this be deemed as a contractual violation seeing as the goods were not, in 
fact, manufactured in Sweden? Accordingly, the value and utility of the goods delivered 
by the seller may indeed, in the author’s opinion, be of some importance when 
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ascertaining whether or not the seller has breached the contract by delivering 
nonconforming goods.  
 
The author hopes to clarify that the financial value and the usability of the goods is by 
no means a starting point in establishing whether or not the delivered goods were of the 
requisite quality to the buyer. As per above, the principle of party autonomy effectively 
enables the parties to agree on how the parties are to behave.
153
 The purpose regarding 
the above argumentation is simply to point out that, in the author's opinion, when 
assessing whether the seller has truly breached a contract by way of delivering 
nonconforming goods, the value and usability of the goods to the buyer should not be 
seen as entirely irrelevant.  
1.2.6 Goods of the Correct Description 
Article 35(1) of the CISG also calls for the seller to deliver goods of the description as 
determined by the parties.
154
 This concept has, in a way, been left on the wayside in the 
recent commentaries for the CISG, while the term quality has been referred to in a 
broader way. Professor Cesare Bianca has stated that “the description is the usual way 
through which the parties determine the content of their obligations.” 155 According to 
Professor Bianca, whether or not the goods delivered match the agreed description 
should be determined on the basis of individual party representations before the 
conclusion of the contract.
156
 To be clearer, the seller’s representations of the goods, for 
example, advertisements that refer to the quality of the goods, should be taken into 
consideration. Moreover, the correct description may also be determined through the 
buyer’s requests regarding the goods that the seller has not objected to.157 It would 
appear that the requirements concerning the correct quality and description seem to be 
somewhat overlapping, which would explain the reason why recent scholarly opinions 
have not focused much on the concept of a contractual description. 
1.2.7 Burden of Proof Regarding Nonconformity Pursuant to Article 35(1) 
In connection with the CISG, it is generally understood that a party making claims 
pursuant to articles of the CISG bears the burden in establishing the reasoning why the 
claim should be supported and accepted.
158
 A case handled by the district court of 
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Vigevano supports the above argument. In that particular case, the court specifically 
emphasized that a party making assertions must also justify why its claims should be 
recognized as correct.
159
 If this view is seen as unilaterally correct, the burden of proof 
in establishing that the goods delivered by the seller were nonconforming would then 
fall on the buyer as it is the party that would ultimately benefit from such a decision.
160
 
Upon inspection of the relevant case law, it is clear that the issue of burden of proof is 
not quite as simple as depicted above. In terms of which party bears the burden of proof 
on whether or not the goods, in the end, were in conformity with the contract, courts and 
arbitral tribunals have made decisions on both sides. At times, the seller has been 
obligated to prove that the goods it delivered matched the contractual definitions.
161
 At 
other times, this burden has been borne by the buyer.
162
 Contrary to the above however, 
according to the prevailing view, in practice, the burden of proof falls initially on the 
seller, but shifts to the buyer at the time of delivery.
163
 The prevailing view appears to 
be the most reasonable as the party in possession of the goods is arguably in the best 
position to establish whether or not the goods are in conformity with the contract.  
Consideration of the practice is important for parties that intend to make assertions 
pursuant to Article 35 of the CISG. Accordingly, parties would be wise to keep records 
throughout the progress of the transaction and, if the time comes, be ready to present 
evidence and argumentation as to how the contract was violated. 
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Chapter 2 
The Supplementary Definition of Conformity Pursuant to Article 35(2) 
of the CISG 
The purpose of the second paragraph of Article 35 of the CISG is to establish certain 
basic expectations regarding the goods to be delivered unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties.
164
 Article 35(2) also serves to assist in situations where the contractual 
expectations in relation to the conformity of the goods have only been insufficiently 
addressed.
165
 Insofar as there are express or implied terms that adequately illustrate the 
expected characteristics of the ordered goods, reliance on Article 35(2) is not 
necessary.
166
 Article 35(2) contains four different definitions as to the conformity of the 
goods. According to Article 35(2):  
Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with 
the contract unless they: (a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same 
description would ordinarily be used; (b) are fit for any particular purpose 
expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, except where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or 
that it  was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgement;(c) 
possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a 
sample or model;(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such 
goods or, where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and 
protect the goods.
167
 
In order to clarify the above article, Professor Stefan Kröll's words are of much help. He 
states that "[Article] 35(2) protects the reasonable expectations of the parties where the 
contractual provisions concerning conformity of the goods are insufficient."
168
  
Within the requirements of Article 35(2), there exists a certain hierarchy. Whenever the 
buyer has informed the seller of a particular purpose, for the goods to be purchased, that 
purpose takes precedence over any assumed ordinary purposes.
169
 As a result, ordinary 
purposes for the goods are relevant only in situations where a particular purpose has not 
been established.
170
 To simplify this sentiment, an example can be given. Ordinarily 
parties could assume that a television purchased would function like any other 
television, that is be capable of broadcasting television programs. However, in a 
                                                          
164 Bianca in Bianca/Bonell, p. 272, para. 2.1; Hyland, p. 312; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 489, para. 2  
165 Honnold, p. 256, para. 225; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, p. 575, para. 12  
166 Bianca in Bianca/Bonell, p. 272, para. 2.1 
167 Art. 35(2) CISG 
168 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 489, para. 3 
169 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 505, para. 61; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, p. 575, para. 12  
170 Ibid. 
39 
 
situation where the buyer has clarified that the television will not be used for viewing 
purposes but that instead it will simply be used as a decorative object, the television 
need not then fulfill the requirements an ordinary purpose would impose on it. In cases 
where it is not clear whether or not the existence of a particular purpose excludes the 
relevance of ordinary purpose, both should be applied in unison.
171
 
Article 35(2) takes into account the known factor that parties might, due to various 
reasons, overlook to express and clarify certain expectations for the goods. In those 
scenarios, Article 35(2) can be seen as a legal backup which ensures that sellers must 
adhere to common and reasonable expectations.
172
 Admittedly, any requirements that 
Article 35(2) might impose can be excluded by the use of express contractual terms.
173
 
Accordingly, parties ought to be aware of the ordinary purposes for the goods if they 
intend to exclude their relevance either by expressing an intended particular purpose or 
by agreeing on express clauses.    
In the following chapter, the first two elements of Article 35(2) will be particularly 
discussed. Less weight will be placed on the last two requirements, as they have 
appeared to be less problematic in case law and scholarly opinions. 
2.1 The Ordinary Purpose for the Goods in Imposing Obligations to 
the Seller Pursuant to Article 35(2)(a) of the CISG 
Article 35(2)(a) of the CISG essentially operates by creating the minimum requirements 
that goods must meet in order for them to be conforming with the contract.
174
 According 
to Article 35(2)(a), “[Goods must be] fit for the purposes for which goods of the same 
description would ordinarily be used.” 175 Goods must be suitable for those ordinary 
purposes unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise 
176
 or an existing particular 
purpose eliminates the need for adherence with ordinary purposes.
177
 Goods are to, at 
the very minimum, be of the quality and utility goods of the same nature would 
ordinarily be.
178
  
                                                          
171 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 505, para. 61 
172 Honnold, p. 255, para. 225; Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, pp. 505-506, para. 63  
173 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 506, para. 64; Lookofsky, pp. 90-91; para. 164 
174 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 506, para. 66 
175 Art. 35(2)(a) CISG 
176 Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, p. 575, para. 13 
177 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 505, para. 61; Schwenzer in Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, p. 575, para. 12;  
178 Kröll in Kröll/Mistelis/Perales Viscasillas, p. 506, para. 67 
40 
 
To this effect, ‘fitness for ordinary purposes’ is generally understood to mean, at the 
very least, the marketability of the goods.
179
 A buyer should usually be entitled to 
expect that the resale of the purchased goods is possible. Accordingly, buyers need not 
usually express such an expectation, but instead reliance on it is justifiable on the basis 
of Article 35(2)(a). 
The above sentiment is also echoed in multiple court cases.
180
 In a case handled by the 
Supreme Court of Germany, the dispute concerned the delivery of Belgian meats. The 
delivered meat contained an unacceptable quantum of dioxin, which subsequently led to 
the confiscation of the goods by Serbian customs officials. As a result, the buyer was 
deprived of the benefits, as they were unable to resell the goods against original 
intentions. In its decision, the court emphasized that the basic expectation in 
international trade regarding goods is that they are resalable. As for edible products, an 
ordinary purpose would also be their fitness for human consumption. By delivering 
goods that were neither resalable nor fit for humans to consume, the seller delivered 
nonconforming goods pursuant to Article 35(2)(a).
181
   
Naturally, the buyer’s purpose might not be to resell the purchased object, but to instead 
use it for the purposes such an object would ordinarily be used. Goods could then be 
expected to be suitable for the buyer’s use in its facilities as machinery or perhaps as 
raw material.
182
 In this context, such expectations are also to be protected. In cases 
where the goods could ordinarily be expected to be suitable for multiple different 
purposes, the goods should, as a general rule, be suitable for all of those purposes unless 
otherwise agreed.
183
 
The idea the that the seller should be held responsible, to a certain extent, for delivering 
goods that are fit for any normal use is built around the understanding that it is generally 
easier for the seller to avoid the defects. Moreover, the seller is generally in a better 
position to procure the necessary insurances.
184
  
The concept of fitness for ordinary purposes is effectively built on the idea of 
reasonability in international trade. Accordingly, courts have found the seller’s delivery 
to have been nonconforming in various cases wherein it is clear that the seller truly 
delivered defective goods. For instance, in a case tried in the Supreme Court of France, 
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the buyer intended to purchase ceramic ovenware. The inherent purpose of the goods 
was usability of the goods in high temperatures. Nevertheless, upon delivery of the 
goods the buyer discovered that the delivered goods were not heat resistant. Taking into 
consideration the ordinary purpose of the goods, the Supreme Court concurred with the 
buyer and stated that the seller delivered defective goods, in that the ovenware was not 
fit for use for the purposes similar goods would ordinarily be used.
185
 In another case, 
the a seller had delivered ashtrays to the buyer, but following the delivery of the goods, 
the buyer found that the delivered goods were, in fact, dangerous, because they 
contained overly sharp edges. In accordance with Article 35(2)(a), the Supreme Court of 
Switzerland held that a buyer of ashtrays is ordinarily entitled to expect goods that are 
not dangerous to the consumers.
186
  
Ordinary purpose also contains the notion that goods must be fit for that purpose for a 
certain period of time.
187
 To this effect, perishable goods such as fruits and meat should 
then be fit for human consumption for a certain period of time following the delivery of 
the goods.
188
 Moreover, the same concept of a necessary duration of usability also 
extends beyond perishable goods.
189
 In this regard, in a case tried in the District Court 
of Munich where the buyer had purchased globes for display purposes, the court found 
that the buyer was entitled to expect a certain lifetime for the purchased goods. Taking 
into consideration the price, according to the Court, it was reasonable and normal to 
expect a lifetime of three years. Having delivered globes that fell far short of this 
expected lifespan, the seller delivered goods which were not in conformity with the 
contract.
190
 
Fitness for ordinary purpose may even require the delivery of proper instructions for the 
construction and usage of the goods, insofar as this can be seen as an ordinary and 
reasonable expectation.
191
 Such a sentiment was supported by, for instance, the Supreme 
Court of Germany.
192
 The case concerned the delivery of printing hardware as well as 
software. Following the delivery, the buyer claimed nonconformity of the delivery since 
the seller had not provided the buyer with appropriate documentation necessary for the 
use of the printing hardware. Accordingly, the Court found the seller’s delivery to have 
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been nonconforming, although the buyer’s claims for a substantial breach and justifiable 
avoidance could not be supported.
193
 
All of the previous scenarios are ultimately based on the reasonability of the 
expectations of the buyer - expectations that any buyer operating in international trade 
could have justifiably relied on even in situations where those expectations were not 
stipulated in the contract document or otherwise addressed during the negotiations 
leading to the conclusion of the contract. Accordingly, buyers can automatically assume 
certain aspects of the impending delivery of the agreed upon goods even without 
specific contractual stipulations. Sellers, on the other hand, must take those ordinary 
expectations into consideration when completing the delivery, unless the parties have 
otherwise agreed. 
Furthermore, when assessing any obligations that Article 35(2)(a) imposes, 
consideration is to be made regarding certain specific factors. These include the price of 
the goods to be purchased and the expertise of both parties.
194
 A higher price of the 
goods naturally leads to more extensive expectations for the condition, durability and 
usability of the goods.
195
 The reputation of the seller could also be seen as a relevant 
factor, as a buyer purchasing from a renowned seller could justifiably have higher 
expectations for the characteristics of the ordered goods.
196
 
With regard to all of the above, a question then arises: where is the limit that no longer 
falls within the expectations for ordinary usage? In this regard, multiple cases have, for 
example, established that the concept of fitness for ordinary purposes by no means 
requires the goods to be of perfect quality.
197
 The goods must simply be fit for the usage 
that similar goods would normally be used. A Belgian Commercial Court, for example, 
acknowledged that while some damage had been caused to the delivered goods, that 
damage did not alter or affect the goods in a way that resulted in the goods being unfit 
for their ordinary purpose. 
198
 Similarly, an ICC arbitral tribunal found that although a 
part of the goods delivered could not be used in the state they were delivered in, the 
goods could “easily be re-transformed” to a condition where they would be fit for their 
ordinary purposes. As a result, the tribunal did not find a violation pursuant to Article 
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35(2)(a) of the CISG.
199
 To this effect, Professor Stefan Kröll asserts that insofar as the 
seller has delivered goods of ‘a reasonable quality’, it has then obliged with the 
requirement imposed by Article 35(2)(a) of the CISG.
200
 
International case law has also frequently witnessed an issue concerning conditions or 
regulations prevalent in the destination state of which the seller, operating in a different 
nation, was not aware of. To what extent should the seller be held responsible for 
ascertaining the conditions that exist in the destination state for the goods when the 
buyer provides no such information? To this effect, scholarly opinions and court cases 
have had to decide under which country's standards - the buyer's or the seller's - should 
the ordinary utility of the goods be assessed. The existing conditions and standards 
could be different in the parties’ states of operation for various reasons such as climate, 
cultural background and so forth. The New Zealand Mussels case 
201
 is, with regard to 
this issue, the leading and most frequently cited case. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the German Supreme Court held that as a general rule, the seller should not be 
held responsible for ascertaining the unique standards and regulations that exist in the 
destination state for the goods that are different than in the seller’s place of operation.202 
Moreover, the New Zealand Mussels case founded a three-point-analysis within which a 
seller should be aware of even the unique standards of the destination state. A seller is 
to inform itself of those standards when the seller’s state acknowledges the same 
standards, the buyer has specifically informed the seller of those standards, or when due 
to ‘special circumstances’, the seller should for one reason or another be aware of those 
standards. In this light, ‘special circumstances’ could, for example, be the seller having 
frequently exported goods to the destination state.
203
 Professor Stefan Kröll agrees with 
the view of the German Supreme Court, in that it is unreasonable to expect that sellers 
are beforehand aware of all the different public law regulations and standards that are 
abided by in the destination state.
204
 To then assume that a seller should, in any case, be 
held responsible for delivering goods that are in accordance with all unique regulations 
and standards would lead to a requirement for the seller to always inform itself of all 
such standards.
205
 It is worth noting, however, that in Professor Kröll's opinion, the 
standard of 'special circumstances' established by the German Supreme Court is 
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frequently applicable, by use of which the seller would then be responsible for 
ascertaining even the unique standards that exist in the destination state for the goods.
206
 
In order to ensure that the seller takes any unique conditions and standards into 
consideration, it is recommendable that the buyer, at the very least, informs the seller of 
those factors. The notification should be sufficiently clear in order to avoid any 
misunderstandings. In terms of a sufficient notification, a Dutch Appellate Court, for 
example, stated that the buyer, having informed the seller of German authorities 
applying ‘strict regulations’, was not adequately specific.207 
In contradiction to the above court cases, multiple scholarly opinions appear to support 
an argument that, by simply informing the seller of the destination where the goods will 
in actuality be used, the buyer has informed the seller of a particular purpose for the 
goods pursuant to Article 35(2)(b).
208
 Professor Peter Schlechtriem, for example, 
contended that whenever the seller has been informed of the state in which the goods 
will ultimately be used, that notification qualifies as a particular purpose pursuant to 
Article 35(2)(b).
209
 Consequently, Professor Schlechtriem asserted that in those 
situations, the seller should usually inform itself of the conditions that prevail in that 
destination state and be held responsible if it did not do so.
210
 In agreement with 
Professor Schlechtriem is also Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer, according to whom, it is 
only in rare cases that reference to Article 35(2)(a) of the CISG should be made when 
the buyer has informed the seller of the state in which the goods will be used.
211
 This is, 
however, not a universal understanding. A multitude of scholars have also reached the 
opposite conclusion, in that the buyer may not simply inform the seller of the 
destination state for the goods and then expect the seller to ascertain and adhere to each 
and every standard existing in the destination state that might affect usability of the 
good there.
212
 To this regard, Professors Fritz Enderlein and Dietrich Maskow 
specifically stated that:  "If the goods in the buyer's country or another country of 
destination have to meet special conditions, for instance with regard to the fulfilment of 
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specific test or security regulations, the seller has to take these into account only if the 
buyer informs him accordingly in advance." 
213
  
The ultimate question then, in terms of whether or not the seller should conform to also 
the unique conditions of the destination state when the buyer has merely informed the 
seller of destination state, boils down to whether such notification suffices as a 
particular purpose pursuant to Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG. Multiple authors such as 
Professors Schlechtriem and Schwenzer take that view,
214
 but, in practice, courts have 
also found against that reasoning.
215
 The author's opinion is that both the application of 
the three-point-analysis as provided by the German Supreme Court as well as the 
application of Article 35(2)(b) could be used to achieve a reasonable end result. As far 
as the author is concerned, Professor Schlechtriem's opinion that the notification of the 
destination state qualifies as a particular purpose is to be endorsed simply for the reason 
that Article 35(2)(b) provides courts and arbitral tribunals with more extensive rules to 
assess the situation.  
Although the buyer may, at times, be in a better position in terms of informing the seller 
of any unique conditions prevailing in the destination state for the goods, those 
situations can effectively be answered by Article 35(2)(b), which requires that the 
buyer’s reliance on the seller must be reasonable and justifiable.216 In cases where the 
buyer is more equipped to assess the characteristics of the goods to be delivered, it 
would then not be reasonable for the buyer to simply rely on the seller to deliver 
suitable goods without appropriate discussions. Generally, however, the seller can 
reasonably be expected to inform itself of the conditions that exist in the destination 
state, especially when the seller is a multinational corporation with sufficient resources 
and when those conditions and standards are relative easy to ascertain. However, as 
regards Professors Schlechtriem's opinion that when a seller has been informed of a 
particular purpose in the sense that the goods are to be used in a specific country, the 
seller should automatically inform itself of all the conditions and standards that might 
affect the usability therein, the author's position is that courts and arbitral tribunals 
should be particularly careful in assessing whether it was truly reasonable for the buyer 
to rely on the seller. A strong presumption in this case that the seller should always be 
held responsible is not to be supported.  
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The aforementioned presumption might otherwise lead to a situation where the buyer is 
effectively aware of the conditions and standards it intends to rely on and is still entitled 
to rely on them in cases where the seller remained unaware of those factors. It is the 
author's view that such a conclusion would be unreasonable, as the buyer could easily 
have avoided the situation by informing the seller of those standards that it already had 
knowledge of. To this effect, the parties' expertise and knowledge of the conditions and 
standards of the destination are the crucial factors in determining whether the buyer 
should have specifically informed the seller of those standards or whether the seller 
should have ascertained that information by itself. Therefore, in cases of obscure 
standards that the seller could not have easily informed itself of, it would arguably not 
be reasonable for a buyer to rely on the seller to ascertain that information and, as a 
result, reliance on particular purpose pursuant to Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG would not 
be justifiable. 
In any event, to avoid any uncertainties, buyers engaging in international purchases 
wishing to impose requirements that the destination state for the goods necessitates 
would be wise to stipulate those requirements in the contract document itself, or at the 
very least, inform the seller of those standards in a sufficiently clear manner. From a 
practical point of view, for any sellers operating in international trade, the general 
concept of better-safe-than-sorry should be followed. Sellers should inform themselves 
of any standards that might affect the marketability and usability of the goods in the 
destination state, insofar as this is within the reach of the seller's resources. 
2.2 The Existence of a Particular Purpose in Accordance with Article 
35(2)(b) and Justifiable Reliance on it 
Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG states that "the goods do not conform with the contract 
unless they are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the 
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show 
that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's 
skill and judgement."
217
 It takes into consideration the known factor in international 
trade that the buyer will frequently not be able to explain and determine the mechanics 
and details that the goods it intends to purchase should contain. In those situations, the 
buyer typically then relies on the seller's greater knowledge to ascertain the expected 
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characteristics of the goods after having informed the seller of the purpose for which the 
goods will be used.
218
  
Article 35(2)(b) contains two prerequisites that must be fulfilled in order for a particular 
purpose to exist. First of all, a buyer must have, either expressly or impliedly, informed 
the seller of its specific and intended purpose for the goods to be purchased.
219
 Second 
of all, the buyer must have actually relied on the seller to deliver suitable goods and 
such reliance must have been justifiable.
220
 In order to ascertain the actual scope of the 
article, both of those prerequisites will be thoroughly addressed in the following 
paragraphs.  
2.2.1 Sufficient Notification 
According to the text of the article, in order to be entitled to rely on a particular purpose 
for the goods, a buyer must inform the seller of that purpose in an adequate manner. The 
article does not require that the purpose is made expressly known, only that the seller 
can be reasonably expected to have become aware of that purpose. To this extent, the 
existence of an implicit notification of a particular purpose was examined in a case tried 
the in the Supreme Court of Austria. The buyer wished to purchase scaffolding decks 
and scaffolding hooks. Upon the delivery of the goods, the buyer discovered that the 
shipped goods did not meet the requisite standards prevailing in Europe for such 
products nor were they safe for use. More specifically, the delivered scaffolding hooks 
could not be used to connect the scaffoldings in a safe manner. The seller, on the other 
hand, claimed that the delivered goods met all the prerequisites and standards in the 
seller's place of operation. Eventually, the Supreme Court stated that the buyer had 
impliedly made it known to the seller that the hooks were to be used in connection with 
certain scaffoldings and that European standards would be imposed on the goods. 
Taking these factors into consideration, the Court stated that the seller had impliedly 
been informed of a particular purpose for the scaffolding hooks that the goods delivered 
did not meet. Accordingly, the Court then found that the seller had breached the contract 
pursuant to Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG.
221
 With regard to implicit notifications, 
Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer and Benjamin Leisinger also refer to situations where the 
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buyer's name might be seen as sufficient in informing the seller of the purpose for which 
the goods will be used.
222
 
It is worth noting that Article 35(2)(b) requires that any particular purpose that the buyer 
intends to rely on is conveyed to the seller before the conclusion of the contract.
223
 Any 
subsequent notification of a particular purpose is therefore not acceptable.
224
  
With regard to a notification of a particular purpose, it is important to note that, in terms 
of Article 35(2)(b), the burden of a sufficient notification effectively falls on the buyer. 
Any statements or representations on the seller's part of the usability of the good are to 
be understood as contractual guarantees and part of the contract as an express term.
225
  
In order to simplify this entire concept, an example may be given. A Finnish buyer 
wishes to purchase tires from a German tire merchant. The parties do not agree in the 
contract document on any express qualities that the tires are to fulfill. The buyer simply 
states that the tires will be used in the northern parts of Finland during winter 
conditions. In this scenario, the buyer has arguably informed the seller of the fact that 
the tires are to be usable on snow. As a result, in order to deliver goods that are in 
conformity with the contract, the seller must deliver tires that are usable in winter 
conditions and provide the necessary grip on snow. Only in a situation where it would 
be found that the buyer was not entitled to rely on the seller's skill and judgment to 
deliver suitable goods would reliance on this particular purpose be unjustifiable. That 
might be the case, for instance, when the seller is not a professional and not aware of the 
characteristics required for a tire to be usable on snow. 
A standard situation for the application of a particular purpose would be a case where a 
buyer informs the seller of a certain need for which it requires the goods and the seller 
would then examine its inventory and choose the most suitable product for the buyer.
226
 
To this effect, Professor Richard Hyland posits that situations where the buyer has 
specifically informed the seller of the intended purpose for the goods are not difficult to 
assess. In those scenarios, the seller is to deliver goods fit for that purpose or refuse 
concluding the contract.
227
 In his opinion, only the situations where the seller was not 
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aware of the buyer's intentions, even though it should have been, pose problems for 
courts and arbitral tribunals.
228
  
Professor Hyland's opinion then goes into the core of Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG. A 
buyer that has sufficiently informed the seller of its particular purpose ensures that the 
seller can no longer argue otherwise. In those cases, the seller is to deliver goods that 
meet the buyer's expectations or face the consequences of nonconformity and, in that, a 
contractual violation. It then stands to reason that the problems witnessed in 
international cases fall within the borders where it is somewhat unclear whether the 
buyer sufficiently notified the seller of its purpose or not.  
With regard to the previous portions of this text, an abundance of scholarly opinions, for 
example, support an argument that a buyer may not simply inform the seller of the 
destination state for the goods and then expect the seller to deliver goods that adhere to 
each and every requirement that particular country imposes on the goods.
229
 In their 
opinion, such a notification does not in itself fulfill the requirements of a sufficient 
notification of a particular purpose. As per above, this scenario has sparked much 
debate and differing opinions. To briefly reiterate previous sentiments, the author 
concurs with the opinion of Professors Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer in 
that a notification of the state in which the goods will, in actuality, be used suffices as a 
particular purpose pursuant to Article 35(2)(b). However, courts and arbitral should then 
carefully consider the circumstances of the case, that is, the expertise of the parties and 
the determinability of the relevant standards in order to determine whether the buyer 
should have provided more information to the seller regarding the conditions that 
prevail in the destination state or whether the seller should have ascertained that 
information itself. Only then can the court or arbitral tribunal decide whether the buyer 
truly relied on the seller's skill and judgment and whether such reliance reasonable in 
the first place. 
In assessing whether the buyer has indeed adequately informed the seller of a particular 
purpose, regard is to be had to all relevant circumstances pursuant to Article 8(3) of the 
CISG.
230
 As a result, it is of some importance to then understand that the intended use of 
the goods need not be stipulated in the terms of a contract, but the buyer may inform the 
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seller of that purpose in any manner, so as long as this notification is done before the 
conclusion of the contract. 
It is also important to note that a particular purpose may impose requirements on the 
goods even beyond their physical characteristics.
231
 A buyer could then, for instance, 
inform the seller that the goods it intends to purchase are to be resold to consumers that 
are particularly motivated by ethical standards. That notification could then effectively 
require the seller to manufacture the goods in a certain manner.
232
 To this effect, the 
seller would then have to ensure, for example, that no child labor be used in the 
production of the goods. If it later then becomes apparent that the seller did not comply 
with this requirement, the goods it produced would be unfit for the buyer's particular 
purpose for the goods, regardless of whether or not the goods themselves were free of 
any tangible defects. 
In the end, the seller's actual knowledge of the buyer's particular purpose is irrelevant. 
In order for a particular purpose pursuant to Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG to exist, it is 
sufficient that the seller was in a position where it should have recognized the buyer's 
specific purpose for the goods.
233
 Buyers are then, as a result, protected from cases 
where the seller relies on its ignorance regarding the existence of any particular purpose. 
The buyer's position is assured by having made sufficient efforts to inform the seller of 
any particular purpose. 
Regarding any particular purpose, the extent of the seller's duties is determined based on 
the amount of information that was available to the seller of that purpose.
234
 In order to 
simplify this assertion, reference to a previous example can be made. In the example, a 
buyer wished to purchase tires suitable for winter conditions. In a situation where the 
buyer was more thorough in explaining the goods that it requires, the seller's duties 
would be determined accordingly. The buyer could then have stated that the tires are to 
be usable in winter conditions, but, moreover, that the tires must not only be usable on 
snow, but that they are also to provide a necessary amount of grip on ice. Having made 
such an expectation clear, the seller should then arguably understand that the buyer is 
not expecting friction tires, but that the buyer instead wishes to purchase studded tires. 
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The extent of the information provided by the buyer was also under question in a case 
tried in the District Court of Regensburg in Germany.
235
 In that instance, the buyer had 
ordered fabrics from the seller to be used in the manufacture of textiles. At no point in 
time had the buyer particularly informed the seller of any specific use of the fabrics, the 
goods were requested simply to be used in the production of skirts and dresses. 
Following the delivery of the raw materials, the buyer claimed that the fabrics could not 
be used in an economical manner. According to the Court, the buyer was not entitled to 
expect fabrics of that nature, since it had not informed the seller of such a purpose. As a 
result, the Court then found no violation pursuant to Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG in that 
the seller had delivered goods unfit for the buyer’s particular purpose.236 Similar 
reasoning was later applied by the District Court of Munich in a previously mentioned 
case, albeit to a different end result.
237
 In that particular case, the buyer had informed 
the seller that it wished to obtain globes that would be used for display purposes. The 
buyer specifically informed the seller of the fact that the globes ordered were intended 
for long term use. Accordingly, when the lifespan of the delivered globes proved far 
shorter than the buyer had expected, the Court found that the globes delivered by the 
seller were in violation of the parties' agreement pursuant to Article 35(2)(b) of the 
CISG. The buyer informed the seller of the expected durability of the goods in a 
sufficient manner.
238
  
With regard to the above, it is then clear that a buyer, much like with contractual 
descriptions, reinforces its position in terms of Article 35(2)(b) by providing the seller 
with more information concerning its intended purpose for the goods. The information 
provided to the seller, coupled with the information that was otherwise available to the 
seller, then together determines the scope of the obligations of the seller as regards any 
particular purpose for the goods. 
2.2.2 Actual and Reasonable Reliance on the Seller 
In order for a particular purpose to exist for a buyer pursuant to Article 35(2)(b) of the 
CISG, there must be not only factual reliance on the seller by the buyer, but that reliance 
must also have been justifiable under the circumstances.
239
 With regard to actual 
reliance, it will arguably be easier to determine situations where it is clear that the buyer 
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was not relying on the seller to assess the necessary characteristics.
240
 The 
aforementioned scenario could, for instance, be at hand when the seller suggests a 
certain product from its inventory but the buyer insists on a different one. The more 
extensive the buyer's part is in selecting the goods to be purchased, the likelier it is then 
that there was no reliance pursuant to Article 35(2)(b).
241
  
Multiple authors assert that it would be for the seller to prove that there was no actual 
reliance on the seller's skill and judgment.
242
 That view is in accordance with the idea 
that a buyer does generally rely on the seller to receive goods that are suitable for the 
buyer's specific purpose.
243
 Accordingly, there is a presumption that the buyer did rely 
on the seller, having informed it of a particular purpose for the goods.
244
 That 
presumption is then for the seller to eliminate.  
According to Professor Cesare Bianca, cases where the buyer did not rely on the seller's 
skill and judgment are impossible to enumerate in detail, but generally situations where 
the delivery does not occur under common terms in the trade and the circumstances are 
foreign to the seller any reliance on the seller's skill and judgment would likely be 
unreasonable.
245
 The same is generally true when the seller operates as a mere 
middleman.
246
   
The reasonability of any reliance on the seller's skill and judgment is assessed on a case-
by-case basis,
247
 but the most pertinent factors are, effectively, the parties' expertise 
regarding the goods in question and the knowledge of the parties as regards the actual 
intended purpose for the goods.
248
 Insofar as the seller is better equipped to assess the 
necessary characteristics of the goods for them to be suitable for the buyer's particular 
purpose, the buyer is, generally, entitled to rely on the seller to deliver suitable goods.
249
 
On the other hand, in cases where the buyer can better assess and determine the qualities 
of the goods it expects to receive, reliance would generally not be justifiable.
250
 
In terms of justifiable reliance, certain guidelines have been established in international 
case law. For instance, in a case tried in the High Court of New Zealand the issue 
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concerned the parties’ knowledge of the destination state's registration requirements for 
imported trucks. The Court stated, in reference to the New Zealand Mussels case,
251
 that 
the buyer possessed, or should have possessed, more knowledge with regard to the 
registration requirements, especially when the buyers were "experienced transport 
operators." 
252
 Accordingly, any reliance on the seller's skill and judgment would not 
have been reasonable pursuant to Article 35(2)(b) of the CISG. Whether or not one of 
the presented reasons would have sufficed by themselves is difficult to assess, but it is 
evident that the buyer's knowledge and expertise were of principal importance in 
assessing the reasonability of any reliance. 
In another case tried in the District Court of Coburg, the Court also took into 
consideration the knowledge and expertise of the parties. According to the Court, the 
buyer was at least on par, if not more knowledgeable, with the seller in terms being 
capable of assessing the necessary attributes for the goods. As a result, the Court stated 
that it was not justifiable for the buyer to rely on the seller's skill and judgment.
253
  
With regard to situations where the parties are equally capable of determining the 
necessary characteristics for the goods to be purchased, it is not entirely clear whether 
the buyer is indeed accorded the right to rely on the seller's skill and judgment. As per 
above, the District Court of Coburg held that the buyer should not be entitled to rely on 
the seller if the buyer is on level footing with the seller in terms of being able to specify 
the necessary qualities for the goods.
254
 Furthermore, Professor Stefan Kröll asserts that 
for as long as the buyer possesses 'sufficient' knowledge regarding the goods under 
purchase, reliance on the seller may no longer be justifiable.
255
 On the other hand, 
scholars such as Thomas Neumann are of the opinion that the buyer's knowledge of the 
goods is irrelevant, for as long as the buyer does not possess a greater level of 
knowledge regarding the usability of the goods.
256
 In any event, these scenarios should 
always be assessed as separate cases and, in this sense, it is perhaps better to not set in 
stone any unavoidable rules. 
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2.3 The Goods Must Be of the Same Quality as the Sample or Model 
Presented to the Buyer 
According to Article 35(2)(c) of the CISG, whenever the seller has presented a model or 
a sample of the good that the buyer is hoping to obtain before the purchase, the final 
good delivered to the buyer must be of equal quality with that model or sample.
257
 This 
is naturally a reasonable expectation. Having presented the buyer with a sample, the 
seller creates expectations on the buyer's part.
258
 Accordingly, the presentation of a 
sample or model then overrides any expectations based on the ordinary qualities and 
particular qualities expected pursuant to Articles 35(2)(a) and 35(2)(b) of the CISG 
should those expectations be in contradiction.
259
 
To this effect, courts have, on various occasions, discovered a lack of conformity in the 
goods delivered, in that they did not meet the expectations of the buyer as established by 
the presented sample or model. The Appellate Court of Frankfurt, for example, held in a 
case that the shoes delivered by the seller were not in accordance with the originally 
presented sample. They appeared to have been manufactured in various manners and 
they were also visibly different from the original sample. Accordingly, the Court then 
found the goods to have been nonconforming. However, the existence of a fundamental 
breach, which would have justified avoidance, was excluded.
260
 In another case, the 
Federal District Court of New York found that the seller had delivered goods that were 
effectively not of the quality as the original sample had been. The delivered goods 
frequently malfunctioned and attempts to repair the defects were fruitless. Accordingly, 
the Court then found that the seller had violated the contract pursuant to Article 35(2)(c) 
of the CISG.
261
 
The extent to which the good ultimately delivered has to live up to with the presented 
model and sample may vary. The sample or model may have been presented to ensure 
the buyer that certain specific characteristics will be similar.
262
 On the other hand, the 
seller may have made a number of reservations regarding certain qualities that the 
purchased good might not contain.
263
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2.4 Packaging Requirements Imposed by Article 35(2)(d) of the CISG 
The last and final prong in establishing conformity requirements is Article 35(2)(d) of 
the CISG, which requires that goods need to be packaged or otherwise contained in a 
suitable manner.
264
 The purpose of the article is to ensure that the buyer ultimately 
receives the goods in an acceptable condition.
265
 The seller's obligation to ensure proper 
delivery extends to the point in time when the buyer takes possession of the goods. 
However, even when the buyer is the party responsible for shipping the goods to the 
actual destination state, the seller is nevertheless the party that must ensure that the 
goods are packaged in manner that allows the buyer to simply load the goods onto a 
ship or aircraft and rely on the fact that the goods will remain in the same condition 
throughout the transportation.
266
  
When determining the characteristics of 'appropriate packaging', one must refer to the 
usual manner in which goods of the same kind are packaged. Moreover, in the absence 
of any ordinary packaging, the goods must, at the very least, be packaged in manner that 
guarantees the delivery of the goods in an unharmed condition.
267
 In assessing the 
adequateness of the packaging, the seller must consider the transportation phase as a 
whole. The shipment might, for example, have to endure extreme climatic conditions.
268
  
If the buyer later discovers that the goods have been damaged during the shipping phase 
due to defective packaging, the seller is then held liable for the damage caused.
269
 This 
sentiment is also supported by the verdict of the Appellate Court of Koblenz. In that 
instance, the buyer had already taken possession of the goods and arranged for re-
shipment. However, the original packaging for the goods was lacking and due to these 
defects, the goods inevitably arrived damaged at its destination. Although the risk of 
nonconformity had already passed to the buyer pursuant to Article 36 of the CISG, the 
seller was nevertheless found to have delivered nonconforming goods to the buyer due 
to defective packaging.
270
  
Insofar as damage has been done only to the packaging itself and the goods within have 
remained unharmed, the seller has upheld its part of the bargain. However, this is 
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naturally only true to the extent that the goods themselves are not sold with the 
packaging included.
271
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Chapter 3  
The Exclusion of Remedies Based on Party Knowledge Pursuant to 
Article 35(3) of the CISG 
Article 35(3) excludes any liability on the seller's part due to any nonconformity 
according to Article 35(2) which the buyer either knew, or at the very least, could not 
have been unaware of.
272
 The purpose of the article is apparent. Buyers can be seen as 
having agreed to the delivery of faulty or defective goods, if the buyer was aware of the 
defects and still decided to purchase them.
273
 In this situation, subsequent claims of 
nonconformity would be unreasonable at the very least. An ordinary situation for the 
application of the article would be a scenario where the buyer was given proper 
opportunity to examine the goods, following which, it deemed them acceptable and 
continued with the purchase.
274
 In this context, it is noteworthy that the CISG does not 
impose an obligation for buyers to examine the goods before the purchase. As such, 
Article 35(3) only becomes relevant in situations where the buyer has nevertheless 
examined the goods or when the buyer, due to other factors, should have become 
informed of the impending nonconformity.
275
 Due to the fact that actual knowledge of 
the buyer may be impossible to prove, Article 35(3) was included with a provision 
according to which even in a situation where the buyer 'could not have been unaware' of 
the nonconformity, it may not subsequently claim nonconformity pursuant to Article 
35(2).
276
  
In addition to situations in which the buyer has, due to whatever reason, examined the 
ordered goods before the purchase, the buyer could also have become informed of the 
nonconformity of the goods by other means.
277
 The parties could have discussed the 
quality of the goods prior to the purchase or the buyer could have purchased goods from 
the seller before and so forth. The price of the ordered goods is also, in the author's 
opinion, of some importance when determining the quality of the goods the buyer was 
entitled to expect. To this effect, Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer and Benjamin 
Leisinger, for example, assert that although a buyer may have required the observance 
of ethical values in the manufacture of the goods it ordered, if the purchase price was so 
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low that the buyer had reason to believe that the seller could not have observed ethical 
standards, the buyer can then no longer rely on implied terms of the 
contract.
278
Although Professor Schwenzer was referring to usages pursuant to Article 9 
of the CISG, in the author's opinion, the price of the goods is also a pertinent factor 
when assessing the applicability of Article 35(3) of the CISG. When the price is very 
low, the buyer can no longer expect goods of perfect quality.  
While Article 35(2) and its various paragraphs are built to reinforce the position of the 
buyer, Article 35(3) is meant to activate in situations where the buyer neither needs nor 
deserves to rely on Article 35(2).
279
 The wording of Article 35(3) of the CISG makes it 
clear that it does not extend to obligations imposed on the seller by the use of express 
contractual terms pursuant to Article 35(1) of the CISG.
280
 That being the case, buyers 
could always rely on express contractual stipulations and subsequently claim 
nonconformity if the goods did not meet the contractual clauses. This would be the case 
even in situations where the buyer either was aware or could not have been unaware of 
the nonconformity at the time of the conclusion of the contract.  
Scholarly opinions appear to unilaterally support the assertion that in no situation could 
Article 35(3) of the CISG be applicable in connection with express contractual 
requirements.
281
 Nonetheless, in international case law, cases can be found where the 
buyer's knowledge of the defect has led to an exclusion of remedies pursuant to Article 
35(3), even if the nonconformity concerned an express contractual clause.
282
 For 
example, in a case tried in the Appellate Court of Canton in Switzerland, Article 35(3) 
of the CISG was deemed to be applicable, even when the nonconformity was due to a 
violation of an express contractual clause. The purchase concerned a used bulldozer that 
the buyer tested before concluding the contract. Moreover, the seller provided specific 
information to the buyer regarding the condition of the bulldozer.  As a result, the Court 
found that the buyer had forfeited any rights to later claim the defective quality of the 
bulldozer.
283
  
While the Norwegian suggestion on the application of Article 35(3) in connection with 
Article 35(1) was rejected during the drafting stage of the CISG, international case law 
does appear to support a limited application of Article 35(3) as regards express 
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contractual clauses.
284
 Furthermore, scholar Thomas Neumann is of the opinion that the 
principle of good faith would appear to support such a conclusion.
285
 
In the author's opinion, the position of the aforementioned courts is to be endorsed. The 
position of the buyer is supported by the use of multiple mechanisms. In cases where the 
buyer is effectively in the know regarding the goods to be delivered, there is no reason 
to differentiate between express contractual clauses and implied reasonable expectations 
pursuant to Article 35(2) of the CISG. Any other conclusion would leave a window 
open for buyers in international trade to purchase defective goods for low costs in the 
hopes of making some use of the purchased goods. That is, of course, reasonable. What 
is not reasonable is that when the buyer later changes its mind, it could still claim 
nonconformity due to defective quality even when the buyer purchased the goods 
knowing full well of the defects.  
Naturally, the article does not cover situations where the defect was not discoverable to 
the buyer and became apparent only after the purchase.
286
 Accordingly, any and all 
purchase situations should be assessed individually to ascertain the extent of an 
appropriate examination by the buyer if there ever was one. The adequateness of any 
examination is generally determined on the basis of examinations that are usual in the 
branch of trade the buyer operates in.
287
 To this effect, it is important to note that in 
terms of bulk orders, the buyer is normally not obligated to examine the entire quantum 
of goods under purchase, but the buyer is, having examined a certain portion of the 
goods, entitled to expect that the rest of the delivery is of the same quality. 
288
 In 
particular, the article is considered to be relevant when dealing with used goods.
289
 
As is apparent from the text of the article, it is only applicable in situations where the 
buyer either knew of the impending nonconformity or when the buyer, due to the 
circumstances, 'could not have been unaware' of the said nonconformity.
290
 With regard 
to the wording 'could not have been unaware, it is seen to only apply in situations where 
the buyer has acted in an obviously careless manner. To this effect, scholar Thomas 
Neumann asserts that the phrase 'could not have been unaware' can be equated with 
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gross negligence on the buyer's part.
291
 In these scenarios, it can then be assumed that 
by acting in a reasonable manner, the buyer would have effectively become aware of the 
nonconformity. 
While the buyer may have acted in a careless manner and inevitably purchased 
defective goods, the buyer can still claim nonconformity of the delivered goods when 
the seller was also aware, or at the very least should have been aware, of the defects and 
effectively attempted to mislead the buyer.
292
 This was established in a case tried in the 
Appellate Court of Köln in Germany. In that instance, both parties were experienced car 
dealers. The contract concerned the purchase of a car registered in 1992. Following the 
purchase, the buyer resold the car further to a third party. Eventually, it was discovered 
that the registration year of the car had, in fact, been 1990 and that the mileage on the 
car was far more than the odometer displayed. Even though the contract included a no 
warranty clause and the buyer could have discovered the nonconformity of the goods if 
it had properly inspected it, the Court found that the seller could not rely on Article 
35(3) of the CISG, since the seller also had knowledge of the defects. The Court 
deemed that the seller had acted in a fraudulent manner and that, as a result, it should 
not be provided any protection pursuant to Article 35(3).
293
 The purpose of this 
sentiment is to protect unwary, even careless, buyers against sellers operating in bad 
faith. In this context, sellers that intentionally attempt to mislead buyers are not entitled 
to rely on Article 35(3) of the CISG. However, the line seems shaky at best. Arguably, 
if the Court found that the buyer had actual knowledge of the registration year and the 
mileage, the seller could have then relied on Article 35(3) of the CISG. 
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Chapter 4 
Additional Contractual Violations in Cases Where Nonconformity 
May Not Be Discovered 
Under the CISG, certain remedies may be pursued even in situations where the 
delivered goods were, in fact, in conformity with the terms of the contract. To this 
effect, Article 45 of the CISG states that: "If the seller fails to perform any of his 
obligations under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may: [both] exercise the 
rights provided in articles 46 to 52 [and] claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 
77."
294
 [Italics added] In this context, parties could agree on additional contractual 
obligations that must be adhered to that might not necessarily have anything to do with 
the condition of the delivered goods themselves. A buyer could, for example, require 
that the seller not use animal testing in its facilities. Although the seller might be able to 
provide the buyer with entirely perfect goods, the seller could be seen as having violated 
a contractual obligation if it then engaged in animal testing during the contractual 
relationship.  
The application of the aforementioned separate contractual obligation can be witnessed 
in the previously cited case from the Appellate Court of Grenoble. In that case, the 
seller had made it specifically clear to the buyer that the goods were to be resold to 
either South America or Africa. By agreeing to conclude the contract, the buyer had 
then agreed to adhere to this obligation. Nevertheless, in the end, the buyer decided to 
resell the goods in Spain. Accordingly, the Court then found the buyer as having 
violated a contractual obligation and ordered the buyer to pay damages to the seller. 
Furthermore, the Court stated that the buyer's breach constituted a fundamental breach 
enabling the seller to avoid its contract with the buyer.
295
 
In another instance, the parties agreed on the delivery of 130 pairs of shoes. The 
contract was to serve as a basis for further deliveries. Following the conclusion of the 
contract, the seller decided to present the shoes bearing the trademark of the buyer at a 
trade convention. By presenting the shoes and their design before the buyer itself, the 
seller injured the relationship between it and the buyer and, as a result, the buyer lost its 
interest in continuing a business relationship with the seller. Furthermore, the shoes 
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themselves were of limited worth to the buyer following their exposure. Accordingly, 
the Court found the seller to have violated a contractual obligation entitling the buyer to 
pursue both damages and avoidance of the contract.
296
  
From the above, it is then apparent that both parties may insist on the incorporation of 
additional contractual obligations. It is recommendable to stipulate those expectations 
sufficiently clearly to ensure their later applicability. Especially any kind of behavioral 
requirements that do not fall within the usual expectations of the parties pursuant to the 
relevant articles of the CISG should be specifically addressed. As far as the buyer is 
concerned, it may, without any specific contractual clauses, expect goods that are usable 
for their ordinary purposes. The seller, on the other hand, may usually only expect that 
the buyer takes control of the goods upon delivery and pays the agreed upon sum. Any 
additional requirements need to be addressed, at the very least, in a certain manner. The 
extent to which a specific notification is required is dependent on the commonness of 
the expectation.  
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Chapter 5 
Obligations of the Buyer upon the Delivery of the Goods 
To be able to rely on Article 35 of the CISG when the seller has delivered 
nonconforming goods, the CISG imposes two separate obligations on the buyer. First of 
all, Article 38 of the CISG states that: 
The buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined, within as 
short a period as is practicable in the circumstances. If the contract involves 
carriage of the goods, examination may be deferred until after the goods have 
arrived at their destination. If the goods are redirected in transit or redispatched 
by the buyer without a reasonable opportunity for examination by him and at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or ought to have known of 
the possibility of such redirection or redispatch, examination may be deferred 
until after the goods have arrived at the new destination.
297
 
 
Second of all, Article 39 of the CISG reads: 
The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does 
not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within 
a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. In 
any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if 
he does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two 
years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, 
unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee.
298
 
Both the above obligations will now be discussed in turn to establish the full extent of 
the obligations of the buyer in connection with any nonconformity claims.  
5.1 The Post-Delivery Obligation to Examine the Goods 
The wording of Article 38 is quite simple to understand. The buyer is to examine the 
goods in as short a time as can reasonably be required. The presumption is that the 
buyer inspects the goods when the seller has completed its obligations in the delivery of 
the goods.
299
 In cases where the goods are transported by using third party operators, the 
examination requirement may be postponed until the buyer has actually acquired 
possession of the goods.
300
 The examination of the goods should then reveal possible 
discrepancies in the delivery, based on which a proper notification must be sent to the 
seller pursuant to Article 39 of the CISG.  
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The purpose of the article is to protect the reasonable expectations of the seller. In cases 
where the buyer does not examine the goods and consequently cannot inform the seller 
adequately of any nonconformity, the seller can expect that the goods it delivered were, 
in fact, of the quality as the buyer expected to receive.
301
 The examination of the goods 
should then reveal any defects that the goods might contain and enable the buyer to 
inform the seller accordingly.
302
 
It is important to note that the buyer does not have to inspect the goods itself, but, as 
provided in Article 38, the buyer may choose any third parties to appropriately examine 
the delivery.
303
  
When determining the appropriate methods for the inspection of the goods, unless the 
parties have agreed on certain standards, the rules of the state in which the goods were 
received apply.
304
 Moreover, in cases where no inspection standards exist, the buyer is 
expected to examine the goods in a manner that is reasonable under the 
circumstances.
305
  Accordingly, it is understood that, for example, in cases where the 
delivery concerns a bulk order or a delivery of highly technical products, the buyer is 
not expected to examine each and every good or to dismantle the product into pieces to 
inspect each part of the delivered good.
306
 The aforementioned falls inherently within 
the concept of reasonability - the application of which can be witnessed across the board 
when reading the text of the CISG.  
To simplify the above reasoning, a buyer could have, for example, contracted with a 
seller for the delivery of a large quantum of bananas. Following the delivery, the buyer 
chooses boxes of the delivered goods at random to be examined to ensure that the goods 
were of the agreed quality. All of the boxes inspected by the buyer conform to the terms 
of the contract and are visibly of flawless quality. The buyer then reships the goods to a 
local supermarket. In the supermarket, it is discovered that one-fifth of the bananas 
delivered are covered in mold. In this case, the time for notifying the seller of the 
nonconformity would begin at the point in time when the nonconformity was 
discovered, not when the examination occurred, for as long as the buyer’s initial 
examination can be deemed sufficient. 
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In cases where the nonconformity is of the quality that the buyer cannot reasonably have 
discovered, or when the nonconformity was effectively impossible to discover, the 
buyer is entitled to notify the seller upon having become informed of the 
nonconformity.
307
 However, it is important to note that the buyer’s right to rely on any 
nonconformity expires, at the very latest, at the point in time where 2 years have passed 
from the delivery of the goods pursuant to Article 39(2) of the CISG.  
Accordingly, cases can be found where courts have granted the buyer the right to pursue 
the nonconformity of the delivery even when much time has already elapsed since the 
buyer received the goods.
308
 In one case, for example, the Court found that the buyer 
could not, by means of a reasonable examination, have detected the nonconformity of 
the delivered fitness clothing. This was due to the fact that only a part of the delivered 
goods were faulty and the buyer could not reasonably be required to inspect each and 
every portion of a substantially large delivery. The buyer had then, being of the mindset 
that that it had received conforming goods, resold the goods further to consumers. The 
consumers later discovered defects in the goods. Upon being informed of the 
nonconformity of part of the delivery, the buyer subsequently informed the seller of the 
said defects. In the Court's opinion, the buyer notified the seller of the nonconformity in 
a reasonable time.
309
  
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the buyer itself bears the burden in 
having insufficiently examined the goods.
310
 If the nonconformity was of the quality 
that the buyer ought to have discovered in its examination and some time has passed 
from the delivery, the buyer has then effectively lost its right to rely on the 
nonconformity in this instance.
311
 For example, in a case tried in the District Court of 
Aschaffenburg, the buyer simply relied on the expertise and integrity of the seller's 
manager without properly inspecting any of the 6 deliveries of the seller. When the 
goods later proved to be nonconforming, the Court found that the buyer had lost its right 
to rely on Article 35 of the CISG pursuant to Articles 38 and 39 because a reasonable 
examination of the goods would have informed the buyer of the defects in the goods.
312
 
In another case, the buyer had received entirely defective goods, in that the shoes the 
buyer purchased were unhygienic and were otherwise in bad condition. However, the 
Court nevertheless deemed that the buyer had lost its right to rely on Article 35 since it 
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had taken over three weeks for the buyer to inspect the goods and a simple random 
examination of the goods upon receipt would have served to inform the buyer of their 
defectiveness.
313
 In the author's view, the latter case is an extreme one and the 
conclusion might, at first glance, seem unreasonable. However, the fact that the contract 
concerned the delivery of second hand goods should be taken into consideration. 
Moreover, the case itself is meant to establish the crystal clear obligation of the buyer to 
inspect the delivered goods in a reasonable manner. 
The examination of the goods upon their delivery serves a distinct purpose. It is to 
reveal any existing nonconformity in the delivered goods. The duty to inspect the 
delivered goods does not, however, stand alone. Article 38 of the CISG must always be 
read in conjunction with Article 39.
314
 Accordingly, the purpose of Article 38 is to 
define the point in time based on which the reasonability of the timeliness of any 
nonconformity complaint will be assessed.
315
 In order to successfully pursue any 
nonconformity in the seller's delivery, the buyer should then both examine the goods 
and inform the seller of any discovered nonconformity in due time. 
5.2 The Obligation to Sufficiently Notify the Seller of the 
Nonconformity  
In order to rely on Article 35 of the CISG, when the seller has delivered nonconforming 
goods, the CISG imposes an obligation on the buyer to inform the seller of that 
nonconformity.
316
 Pursuant to Article 39, the buyer is expected to inform the seller of 
any nonconformity within a reasonable time of having become aware of the 
defectiveness in the goods.
317
 In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on the 
nonconformity if a notification is not given to the seller within two years of the 
delivery.
318
  
To be adequate, in addition to being sent within an acceptable period of time, the 
notification must also fulfill certain prerequisites content wise. The sent notice must, 
first of all, contain information regarding the discovered nonconformity.
319
 Second of 
all, the notice must effectively include the buyer's specified disapproval of the 
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delivery.
320
 Accordingly, it is then insufficient that the buyer merely informs the seller 
of the discovered defect; the buyer must also inform the seller that it is not satisfied with 
the delivery. 
Evidently, the purpose of the article is to protect the position of the seller and the 
expectations of the seller as to its reasonable expectations. This is due to the simple 
reason already provided earlier: When the buyer unreasonably delays in informing the 
seller of the nonconformity, the seller can justifiably understand that the goods it 
delivered were acceptable to the buyer.
321
 However, both the timeliness and the 
sufficiency of a notification should be interpreted in light of the concept of 
reasonability. The purpose of Article 39 is not to impose artificial and 'overly 
burdensome' requirements on the buyer.
322
 
In the following portion of the text, the notification requirement will be discussed both 
in terms of how detailed a notification should be and how soon can the buyer be 
expected to inform the seller of the discovered nonconformity.       
5.2.1 The Specificity of the Notification 
There is no general standard regarding how detailed a notification of nonconformity 
must be. Accordingly, the circumstances at hand and the positions of the parties must be 
taken into consideration when assessing whether or not a notification was, indeed, 
specific enough.
323
 It is important to recognize that the notification is meant to serve a 
specific purpose.  It is intended to inform the seller of the fact that the delivered goods 
were not acceptable to the buyer and that the buyer is either hoping for the seller to 
remedy the defect itself, or to pursue the remedies that are available to it.
324
 To this 
effect, Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer asserts that the requirements for an adequate 
notification should not be overemphasized.
325
 As such, the notification would typically 
be adequate for as long as it conveys to the seller the buyer's unwillingness to accept the 
delivered goods in their current state and informs the seller of the discovered defects in 
a manner that enables the seller to consider the possibilities available to it.
326
 
Admittedly, in order to consider whether the defect can be remedied by the seller itself, 
the notification given must contain a sufficient amount of information regarding the 
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discovered nonconformity.
327
 Consequently, a notice that merely informs the seller of 
the buyer's discontent regarding the delivery but does not explain how the goods were 
defective cannot generally be seen as adequate.
328
 Regarding the specificity of a 
notification, the Appellate Court of Graz asserted that:  
The lack of conformity is considered to be sufficiently specified if the skilled 
seller knows what is meant; the notice must enable the seller to conduct a 
follow-up examination and to initiate the necessary steps for the removal of 
defects. However, the requirements for the description of the defect -- especially 
with regard to the radical legal consequences -- must not be overdrawn.
329
    
In connection with the above, the adequacy of a notification was, for example, explored 
in a case tried in the Appellate Court of Schleswig. In that instance, the buyer notified 
the seller that the received sheep were in bad physical condition. The buyer specified 
that the sheep, due to their physical state, were not in accordance with Danish 
regulations and that, as a result, the buyer could not use them. The Court found that 
these actions were sufficient to inform the seller that the buyer intended to return the 
sheep to the seller and avoid the contract.
330
 The opposite end result was reached by the 
District Court of Saarbrücken, when the buyer had simply informed the seller of the fact 
that consumers had complaints regarding the quality of the goods. According to the 
Court, such a notification does not fulfill the requirements for an acceptable notification, 
as it did not explain in any manner how the goods were factually defective.
331
  
It is submitted that a notification does not generally have to explain the discovered 
defect in a manner that requires no any additional investigation on the seller's part, for 
as long as the buyer explains what kind of consequences occurred as a result of the 
defect.
332
 To this effect, the Appellate Court of Koblenz has stated that:"It suffices that 
the buyer describes the symptoms of the claimed defect. The buyer does not need to 
enquire into its causes."
333
 As per the above, however, a notification that merely states 
that consumers were not satisfied with the goods but does not explain why is usually 
insufficient. 
When assessing the adequateness of any notification, multiple factors need to be 
considered. To this effect, the buyer being an expert, for example, could lead to a 
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requirement of a more specific notification.
334
 Naturally, the characteristics of the goods 
and the nonconformity itself are also relevant.
335
 It stands to reason that the more 
difficult the defect is to assess, the less demanding the requirements for a notification 
regarding that defect should be. The expertise of the seller is likewise relevant. The 
more knowledgeable the seller is, the less information the seller should require to 
ascertain the nature of the nonconformity.
336
 
As an additional factor, it is important to note that when numerous defects are 
discovered, the buyer is expected to notify the seller of each defect.
337
As a result, buyers 
need to acknowledge that informing the seller of one defect does not provide the buyer 
the opportunity to pursue remedies regarding other defects if the seller was not 
accordingly informed.  
In the author's view, it is important to understand that the notification is meant to inform 
the seller of the fact that the buyer is either hoping for the seller to take action or 
intending to pursue the various remedies offered by the CISG. The seller, on the other 
hand, should be informed to provide itself with the opportunity to take appropriate 
action. As such, for as long as the notification is given in a reasonable time and informs 
the seller of both the defectiveness of the goods and the intentions of the buyer, it 
should be seen as acceptable. The requisite specificity should be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. The purpose behind Article 39 and the CISG itself do not support the 
supposition that the notification requirement should be interpreted too strictly.     
5.2.2 The Timeliness of the Notification 
Article 39 of the CISG calls for the buyer to inform the seller of any discovered 
nonconformity in the seller's delivery within a reasonable time.
338
 As an ultimate 
deadline the article requires that the seller is informed of any nonconformity, at the very 
latest, before 2 years has elapsed from the time of the delivery.
339
  
The starting point, based on which the reasonability of the notice will be assessed, is the 
moment in time when the buyer becomes aware of the nonconformity or, alternatively, 
when the buyer should have become aware of it.
340
 Accordingly, the obligation of a 
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post-delivery examination pursuant to Article 38 of the CISG is of principal importance 
when determining the point in time when the buyer discovered or ought to have 
discovered the nonconformity.
341
 Failing to appropriately inform the seller of the 
nonconformity in a reasonable time or, in any event, two years after the delivery, will 
consequently result in the buyer's inability to rely on any nonconformity in the seller's 
delivery.
342
  
5.2.2.1 Notice within a Reasonable Time 
It is submitted that the concept of a reasonable time, in terms of notifying the seller, is 
to be understood as a short period.
343
 On many occasions, it might even require the 
buyer to inform the seller immediately upon having discovered the nonconformity.
344
 
Yet, while it is understood that the term 'reasonable time' refers to a short period of 
time, there is no uniform standard as to how long that 'reasonable time' really is. 
Accordingly, whether or not the buyer's notification was truly given within a reasonable 
time, is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
345
 To this effect, for example, whether or 
not the goods are perishable is to be taken into consideration.
346
  
In terms of establishing a predictable and uniform timeframe for a notification, 
Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer suggested the application of a one month or 'noble 
month' -period.
347
 Professor Schwenzer's proposal has subsequently been endorsed by 
several court decisions
348
 and scholars such as Camilla Baasch-Andersen.
349
 Although, 
the purpose behind Professor Schwenzer's proposal appears to be reasonable, in 
practice, the concept of a 'reasonable time' has nevertheless varied tremendously and 
Professor Schwenzer's suggestion has, by no means, been uniformly accepted.
350
  
For example, in the previously mentioned New Zealand Mussels case, the German 
Supreme Court took into consideration the jurisdictional backgrounds of the parties and 
consequently held the six weeks within which the buyer had notified the seller of the 
nonconformity as reasonable.
351
 In another case, the Appellate Court of Karlsruhe held 
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that even in the case of non-perishable goods, a notification of nonconformity should be 
sent to the seller within eight days.
352
 Furthermore, the Commercial Court of Zürich has 
stated that regarding durable goods, a two week period for the buyer to notify the seller 
should be seen as sufficient.
353
 
Professor Harry Flechtner was reluctant to provide any initial time span in ascertaining 
what constitutes as a 'reasonable time'. According to Professor Flechtner, the 
reasonability of the notice should be assessed based on whether or not the notice has 
caused any detriment to the seller. If none existed, the notification would have then been 
on time.
354
      
While Professor Schwenzer's suggestion of a standard period of time, based on which 
the reasonability of the notice would be assessed, would further the consistency and 
predictability of international verdicts and arbitral awards, international case law does 
not support the incorporation of a unilaterally applicable period for notice. The standard 
of one month would lead to unreasonable situations, for example, when the seller has 
delivered perishable goods that may have deteriorated to a point where they are entirely 
unusable if the buyer waits for a month to give notice of the discovered defect. When 
the delivery concerns perishable goods, a notice should be given promptly, at the very 
latest, within a few days.
355
  
Professor Schwenzer's proposition may be applied as a basis in determining the time 
within which a notification must be provided in the case of non-perishable, non-
seasonal goods.
356
 Based on the circumstances of the case, that period could then be 
modified accordingly.
357
 However, in the author's opinion, it is questionable whether the 
buyer truly requires an entire month to provide the seller with a notification of a 
discovered defect. That could be the case when the defect requires a thorough analysis 
based on which the buyer could then inform the seller of the nonconformity in detail, 
but, in the author's view, a buyer does not generally require that long a period of time to 
notify the seller. Such a conclusion is also supported by an abundance of case law that 
has applied the period of notice rather strictly.
358
 In any event, whether or not courts 
apply an initial standard in the assessment of a reasonable time, the circumstances of the 
case are always of importance. Accordingly, it is then always within the discretion of 
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the court or arbitral tribunal to individually determine the acceptable time for a 
notification.
359
    
From the above, a simple conclusion may be drawn as regards the obligations of the 
parties. First of all, the buyer is to examine the goods as soon as can reasonably be 
required. That examination is then used as a basis in assessing the reasonability of any 
notice of nonconformity given to the seller. While the author cannot provide for a 
specific period within which a notice must be given in order to maintain all remedies 
regarding a nonconforming delivery, an approximate period of two weeks should 
generally fall within the acceptable time frame. However, regarding perishable goods 
such as foodstuff, a notice must be provided earlier. 
5.2.2.2 The Ultimate Deadline for a Notification   
In order to protect the seller's position, Article 39(2) of the CISG was equipped with an 
ultimate notion that the buyer will lose all rights to rely on any nonconformity if the 
seller is not accordingly notified within two years after the delivery of the goods.
360
 This 
is true, regardless of whether or not it was even possible for the buyer to ascertain the 
nonconformity.
361
 While the consequences of such an unavoidable obligation may, at 
times, seem drastic, the drafters of the CISG saw it fitting to provide contractual parties 
in international trade a certain measure of reliability and consistency.  
However, as pointed out by Professor Girsberger, Article 39(2) of the CISG has never 
been applied in practice, where a buyer would have lost its right to rely on the 
discovered nonconformity due to the fact that the two year window had elapsed.
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Chapter 6  
Final Thoughts 
The purpose of the research was to ascertain and explain the prevailing interpretations 
regarding a nonconforming delivery and additional contractual violations. The positions 
of the parties could then be thoroughly explained in order to provide for a text that 
might be used as a point of reference in that respect as well. 
The assessment of what a party may rightfully expect from their contractual partner is 
primarily defined in the terms of the contract itself. Those expectations must be clarified 
in sufficient detail, but, in the end, parties are also protected through the concept of a 
reasonable person. For as long as those contractual expectations have been explained in 
a manner that a reasonable person in the counterparty's position would have accordingly 
understood them, the asserting party may justifiably expect adherence.  
Any expectations regarding the conformity of the delivery are also protected by the 
supplementary definitions of conformity pursuant to Article 35(2) of the CISG. To this 
effect, Article 35(2) sets forth the basic expectations a buyer may have for the goods it 
intends to purchase. Those expectations are then automatically protected, unless 
otherwise agreed.  
On the basis of a contractual violation, be it through the nonconformity of the delivered 
goods or through the violation of an additional contractual obligation not relating to the 
conformity of the delivery, the aggrieved party may choose to pursue the various 
remedies as provided by the CISG or the contract itself. However, it is important to 
remember that reliance on nonconformity on the buyer's part requires adherence to the 
obligations imposed by Articles 38 and 39 of the CISG, that is, a proper examination of 
the delivered goods and a sufficient and timely notification of the discovered 
nonconformity. 
From international case law as well as recent scholarly opinions, it is evident that the 
drafters of the CISG were originally both unable to foresee all the potential issues that 
might arise in connection with the conformity of goods and unwilling to address certain 
issues that they left for courts and arbitral tribunals to resolve instead. As a result, the 
text of Article 35 is, at times, somewhat limited in answering all those issues, which 
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consequently leads to situations where the interpretation of the article is arguably being 
stretched to answer those issues.  
Most of all, this is true in connection with the concept of quality pursuant to Article 
35(1). In the understanding of a layman, quality would arguably refer to the tangible 
attributes of the goods, but recent sociological developments have led to a situation 
where the intangible characteristics for the goods have also become relevant. Due to this 
development, for instance, the origin of the goods and how a particular good was 
manufactured may be instrumental in assessing whether or not the seller delivered 
conforming goods. Evidently, courts and arbitral tribunals have seen it fitting to include 
these considerations into the concept of quality, whereby the seller may be seen as 
having violated the contract even if it delivered physically flawless goods.  
In the author's view, however, the above is not an unreasonable development. The 
situations where the intangible qualities for the goods are of the essence to the buyer are 
not generally difficult to assess for the seller. For example, in scenarios where the buyer 
operates in a specific ethically-oriented market, any reasonable seller should understand 
that the goods it intends to purchase need to be manufactured in an ethical manner. 
These situations have become commonplace in today's world and need to be taken into 
consideration by the seller. In the same vein, the origin of the goods can also justifiably 
be of some importance to the buyer. Insofar as the seller can reasonably be expected to 
be aware of the buyer's expectations as regards such intangible qualities, there is no 
reason to treat these qualities in a different manner than physical qualities. 
In terms of future application of Article 35, the contract document itself will obviously 
remain the principal tool in determining contractual obligations. The parties are to 
define the expected quality and quantity of the delivery in the contract itself. With 
regard to Article 35(1), the only portion of it that is subject to development is arguably 
the concept of quality. It is possible that the intangible qualities for the goods will obtain 
an increasing role in the determination of whether or not the seller's delivery was 
conforming. Although possibly foreign to a layman, for as long as that intangible 
characteristic is in one way or another attached to the goods themselves and their 
usability to the buyer, that intangible attribute can justifiably be a part of the quality 
determination pursuant to Article 35(1). Consequently, for example, the manner in 
which a certain good is manufactured may potentially become even more important in 
assessing whether or not the seller delivered conforming goods. Such a development is 
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already evident in international business. It can be witnessed in the growing importance 
placed on ethical and environmental standards. Presumably, parties will be even more 
active in the future in imposing these behavioral requirements on the counterparty.  
As for Article 35(2), it is clear that it has operated as a safety-net of sorts in 
international trade. In the author's view, Article 35(2) and its supplementary definitions 
of conformity have been rather successful. Article 35(2) displays and protects the 
across-the-board principle of the CISG to protect the reasonable expectations of the 
counterparty. While the concept of reasonability may effectively evolve in the future, 
the wording of the article appears to be capable of adapting in accordance with such 
international developments. To this effect, if the understanding regarding the ordinary 
usage for a good changes, those new expectations are protected by way of Article 
35(2)(a). Moreover, if the buyer informs the seller of a particular intention for the 
goods, the seller is to inform itself of the requirements imposed by that purpose 
pursuant to Article 35(2)(b). Accordingly, the author believes that Article 35(2) itself is 
articulated in a manner that enables it to adapt when necessary. In light of the ethical 
and environmental prospects presented above, the manner in which a good is 
manufactured can effectively become an ordinary expectation in the future. In this case, 
these expectations would already be protected by way of Article 35(2)(a) without any 
additional contractual definitions.  
However, as regards any behavioral requirements, in the current situation the author 
urges any parties operating in international trade to incorporate specific contractual 
clauses into their contracts that require the counterparty to, for example, manufacture 
the goods in an ethical manner. It is also recommendable to accompany that clause with 
a sufficient contractual penalty clause. While such terms are increasingly utilized, they 
are not yet uniformly applied and in cases of ambiguity, misunderstandings may easily 
arise.     
 
